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INTRODUCTION

The passage of the Pacific Northwest Electric Power Planning and Conservation Act' in December, 1980, signaled the advent of a new era in electric power planning in the Pacific Northwest. The Act responds to a perceived long-term shortage of
electricity' by directing the Bonneville Power Administration
(BPA) to allocate entitlements to existing electric power supplies,3 prescribing processes by which BPA can acquire new
1. Pub. L. 96-501, 94 Stat. 2697, 16 U.S.C. §§ 839-839h (Supp. IV 1980) [hereinafter cited as Power and Conservation Act).
2. In 1980 substantial electric energy deficits were projected for the Pacific
Northwest for the foreseeable future. For example, the Pacific Northwest Utilities
Conference Committee (PNUCC) West Group Forecast claimed that the region
faced an 80% cumulative probability that it could not meet its firm energy loads
by 1984-85; by 1989-90 this probability, according to the PNUCC forecast, would
increase to 98%. See Jackson, The Pacific Northwest Electric Power Planning
and Conservation Act-Solution for a Regional Dilemma, 4 U. PUGET SOUND L.
REV. 7, 8 n.6 (1980). Only two years later, however, the Bonneville Power Administration (BPA) is now projecting electric surpluses throughout the remainder of
the 1980's. See infra note 197.
3. See generally § 5, 16 U.S.C. § 839c (Supp. IV 1980). BPA's inability to
continue to meet the needs of its customers-public and private utilities and some
17 electro-process industries-with existing electric supplies prompted the agency
to suspend sales to investor-owned utilities in 1973. Three years later, in 1976,
BPA issued "Notices of Insufficiency" to its public utility customers, declaring
that it could not meet future load growth after 1983, and informed its industrial
customers that their power supply contracts would not be renewed after they expired during 1981-91. See Katz, The Regional Power Act: An InstitutionalInnovation in Decisionmaking in PACIFIC NORTHWEST RIVER BASINS COMM'N, EcoNOMIC ISSUES IN THE COMPETITION FOR COLUMBIA BASIN WATER 50-51 (1981).
It is clear that a principal motivating force for the enactment of the Power
and Conservation Act was the desire to avoid the welter of litigation expected to
accompany these actions. See HousE COMM. ON INTERIOR AND INSULAR AFFAIRS,
H.R. REP. No. 976, pt. II, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 30-32 (1980) [hereinafter cited as
INTERIOR REPORT]. However, passage of the Act precipitated a flurry of litigation,
particularly regarding BPA's August 28, 1981, offer of power sale contracts to its
customers. See H. Spigal, Trends in Regional Power Act Litigation (June 5, 1982)
(paper presented at University of Washington Law School Conference on the Pacific Northwest Electric Power Planning and Conservation Act), summarizing recent litigation and noting that since passage of the Act, 11 suits have been filed
concerning BPA's power marketing actions and eight suits (now consolidated into
one case) have been filed concerning BPA's 1981 rate increase; see also 47 Fed.
Reg. 25,308 (June 10, 1982) (regarding BPA's proposed amendments to its contracts to settle a number of suits).
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sources of electricity,' and establishing a new interstate planning
council-the Pacific Northwest Electric Power and Conservation
Planning Council (Regional Council)-to develop a twenty-year
regional plan that will govern the region's electric energy future.
On April 6, 1982, the Ninth Circuit agreed with public utility customers that

the contracts BPA offered its industrial customers violated the longstanding congressional policy of giving preference to public bodies and cooperatives in the allocation of electric power produced at federal dams. This policy was expressly affirmed in § 10(c) of the Power and Conservation Act. 16 U.S.C. § 839h(c) (Supp.
IV 1980). See Central Lincoln Pub. Util. Dist. v. Johnson, 673 F.2d 1076 (9th Cir.
1982). On the origins and purpose of the preference clause, see Fereday, The
Meaning of the Preference Clause in Hydroelectric Power Allocation Under Federal Reclamation Statutes, 9 ENvTL. L. 601 (1979). However, § 5(c) of the Power
and Conservation Act removed much of the rate disparity between preference customer consumers and residential and small farm consumers served by investorowned utilities by authorizing BPA to exchange its low cost power for an
equivalent amount of a utility's power, BPA will purchase at the utility's average
system cost. 16 U.S.C. § 839c(c) (Supp. IV 1980). Increased costs to BPA during a
four-year phase-in are to be recouped through increased rates paid by direct service industries. See Bonneville Power Administration, Administrator's Record of
Decision: Average System Cost Methodology (Aug. 1981).
4. See 16 U.S.C. § 839d (Supp. IV 1980). BPA's major resource acquisitions
(over 50 megawatts and longer than five years) are to be governed by the Regional
Council's energy plan. See infra note 5. All acquisitions are subject to a "costeffectiveness" test, which is to include quantifiable environmental costs and benefits, and a four-tiered priority scheme that favors conservation measures, renewable resources, and resources that use waste heat or have high-fuel conversion capacity over large-scale central generating facilities, such as coal and nuclear power
plants. See § 4(e)(1), (2), § 3(4), 16 U.S.C. §§ 839b(e)(1), (2), 839a(4) (Supp. IV
1980). See Michie, Impacts of the Pacific Northwest Electric Power Planning and
Conservation Act on the Development of Energy Resources in the Pacific Northwest: An Analysis of the Resource Acquisition Priority Scheme, 4 U. PuGEr
SOUND L. REv. 299 (1981); Luce & McLennan, Acquisition of Energy Resources
Under the Pacific Northwest Electric Power Planning and Conservation Act: A
Look to the Future, 4 U. PUGEr SOUND L. REv. 61 (1981). Not all commentators
welcomed BPA's new acquisition authority; see Cavanagh, The Pacific Northwest
Electric Power Planning and Conservation (and Thermal Power Plant Relief)
Act, 4 U. PUGET SOUND L. REv. 27 (1980).
5. See § 4(e), 16 U.S.C. § 839b (Supp. IV 1980). The Pacific Northwest Electric Power and Conservation Council (Regional Council) is a unique eight-member
body composed of two gubernatorial appointees each from the states of Idaho,
Montana, Oregon, and Washington. Since its plan will have considerable influence
over the actions of federal agencies (see infra text accompanying notes 217-35),
the Regional Council should be viewed as part of an ambitious attempt to restructure federal-state decisionmaking authority governing Pacific Northwest electric
energy and natural resources allocation. For discussions of state-federal authority,
see generally 12 ENvTL. L. No. 4 (1982).
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A unique aspect of the Act is its attempt to preserve and restore the Pacific Northwest's fish and wildlife resources. These
resources, particularly the Columbia Basin's economically valuable anadromous fish runs,7 have diminished alarmingly in recent
years, primarily due to the culmination of half a century of dam
building.6 Completion of major storage projects in the upper
Columbia Basin in the 1970's enabled power managers to harness
the spring freshet for power production later in the year., Unfortunately, downstream migrating juvenile salmon and steelhead
depend upon high spring streamflows for transportation to the
sea. Moreover, many dams on both the mainstem Columbia and
Snake rivers are not equipped with screens or other effective
means to enable downstream migrants to bypass power turbines.
The combination of diminished spring flows and poor bypass facilities has proved disastrous to anadromous fish in low water
years, when cumulative mortalities can reach ninety-five percent. 10 As a result, the once bountiful fish runs of the upper Columbia Basin are now so depleted that endangered species status
6. Section 2(6) states one of the Act's six purposes is to:
protect, mitigate and enhance the fish and wildlife, including related
spawning grounds and habitat, of the Columbia River and its tributaries,
particularly anadromous fish which are of significant importance to the social and economic well-being of the Pacific Northwest and the Nation and
which are dependent on suitable environmental conditions substantially obtainable from the management and operation of the Federal Columbia
River Power System and other power generating facilities on the Columbia
River and its tributaries.
16 U.S.C. § 839(6) (Supp. IV 1980).
7. Anadromous fish, such as salmon and steelhead trout, spawn and are
reared in fresh water streams, migrate to marine waters for periods of three to five
years, and complete their life cycle by returning to their native stream to
reproduce. See, e.g., United States v. Washington, 384 F. Supp. 312, 405 (W.D.
Wash. 1974).
8. U.S. COMPTROLLER GEN., IMPACTS AND IMPLICATIONS OF THE PACIFIC NORTH-

(EMD-79-105, Sept. 4, 1979) [hereinafter cited as 1979 GAO
that although a variety of factors have contributed to the
decline of the fish runs-including logging, irrigation, and overfishing-the principal adverse effects are attributable to the construction and operation of dams).
9. For a history of Columbia Basin dam building, see Blumm, Hydropower vs.
Salmon: The Struggle of the Pacific Northwest's Anadromous Fish for a Peaceful
Coexistence with the Columbia River Power System, 11 ENVTL. L. 211, 223-49
(1981) [hereinafter cited as Hydropower vs. Salmon].
10. See id. at 217-21 for a portrayal of the conflicts between hydropower production and anadromous fish protection.
WEST POWER BILL 20
REPORT] (concluding
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has been seriously considered."
In the Power and Conservation Act, Congress made clear
that it is now time to begin to repay the substantial debt that the
hydroelectric resource owes to the fish and wildlife resource.
Under section 4(h) of the Act, the Regional Council is to formulate a comprehensive program designed to preserve and restore
fish and wildlife that have been adversely affected by Columbia
Basin hydroelectric project construction and operation."2 This
program is to be based on recommendations submitted to the
Council from the region's federal and state fish and wildlife agencies, Indian tribes, and others.18 The Council's Fish and Wildlife
Program, scheduled for approval by November 15, 1982, is the
key component in the effort to ensure that consumers of electric1
ity pay the full social cost of hydroelectric power generation. 4
This Article analyzes several Fish and Wildlife Program approval issues that must be resolved by the Regional Council. Section II of the Article places the 4(h) Program in context by exam11. See 43 Fed. Reg. 45,628 (1978); and Bodi, Protecting Columbia River
Salmon Under the Endangered Species Act, 10 ErTL. LAW 349 (1980).
12. See Blumm & Johnson, Promising a Process for Parity: The Pacific
Northwest Electric Power Planning and Conservation Act and Anadromous Fish
Protection, 11 ENvT. LAW 497 (1981) [hereinafter cited as Promising Parity).
While the geographic limit of the Fish and Wildlife Program is the Columbia Basin, other fish and wildlife provisions, notably § 4(e)(2), extend beyond the Basin
to the entire Pacific Northwest (e.g., including the Puget Sound and Oregon
coastal areas) 16 U.S.C. § 8396(e)(2) (Supp. IV 1980). See infra notes 30-31.
13. 16 U.S.C. § 839b(h)(2)-(5) (Supp. IV 1980). Federal water managers, BPA
customers, and the public may also submit recommendations. On November 15,
1981, a coalition of the region's federal and state fish and wildlife agencies and
Indian tribes submitted voluminous 4(h) recommendations to the Regional Council. See Northwest Power Planning Council, Recommendations for Fish and Wildlife Program Under the Pacific Northwest Electric Power Planning and Conservation Act, vols. 1 & 2 (Dec. 1981) [hereinafter cited as Fishery Agency and Tribal
4(h) Recommendations]. Comments were also submitted by state water resources
departments, BPA, and PNUCC, see id. at vols. III & IV. The recommendations
pertaining to anadromous fish are summarized in NATURAL RESOURCES LAW INSTITUTE, 16 ANADROMOUS FISH LAW MEMO (Dec. 1981).
14. Section 2(4) states that one of the Act's purposes is to ensure that BPA
customers and their consumers continue to pay all the electric power costs, which
§ 4(h)(8)(B) makes clear include fish and wildlife costs. 16 U.S.C. §§ 839(4) and
839b(h)(8)(B) (Supp. IV 1980). See also HousE COMM. ON INTERSTATE AND FOREIGN COMMERCE, H.R. REP. No. 976, pt. 1, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 49 reprinted in
1980 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 5989, 6015 [hereinafter cited as CoMmERcs
REPORT].
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ining the reasons why predecessor legislation, notably the Fish
and Wildlife Coordination Act, failed to protect adequately the
Columbia Basin's imperiled anadromous fish runs. Section III
surveys program approval standards that Congress directed the
Council's program to meet. Section IV develops a theory that potentially conflicting approval standards must be interpreted consistently. Section V applies this theory by analyzing the meaning
of specific program standards concerning scientific proof, economic cost, and Indian treaty rights. Section V concludes that
Congress intended the Council to defer to the biological judgment
of those agencies and tribes with experience in managing the region's fish and wildlife, and that Congress intended biological
considerations to prevail over economic considerations. These
conclusions form the basis for the suggestion in section VI that
the Council employ a two-pronged test in evaluating fish and
wildlife measures: (1) is the measure biologically sound? and (2)
is it economically and technologically feasible? Section VI argues
that the Power and Conservation Act does not give the Regional
Council the authority to reject such measures on the basis of a
cost-benefit analysis. The use of a cost-benefit standard will not
result in maximization of both the hydropower resource and the
fish and wildlife resource, an overriding goal of the Act. Section
VII suggests that the institutional changes necessary to implement the Council's Fish and Wildlife Program can be facilitated
if the program orders federal water managers to develop administrative records that demonstrate consistency with the program
and with the congressional directive of providing "equitable treatment" to fish and wildlife. Finally, section VIII concludes that the
use of a feasibility standard to formulate the contents of the 4(h)
Program and the adoption of administrative records to help implement the program will supply the incentives necessary for the
Pacific Northwest to have both viable anadromous fish runs and
an economical and reliable power supply that internalizes all of
its costs.
II.

THE FAILURE OF THE FISH AND WILDLIFE COORDINATION

AcT

AND THE REMEDIAL NATURE OF THE 4(H) PROGRAM

The fundamental notion underlying section 4(h) of the Power
and Conservation Act is the congressional realization that past
legislation designed to protect the region's fish and wildlife re-
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sources, particularly its anadromous fish runs had failed. 5 These
runs were described by the House Commerce Committee as
"probably the most important water-related resource of the region. '"'6 That the Act in general, and the 4(h) Program in particular, are aimed at restoring the region's fish and wildlife resources,
especially its depleted anadromous fish runs, is clear from both
the text of the statute 7 and its legislative history.' 8 Nothing in
the language of the statute suggests that Congress intended anything less than complete compensation for fish and wildlife losses
incurred due to hydroelectric project development and operation."9 An examination of previous legislative failures will suggest
potential pitfalls that the Council's Fish and Wildlife Program
must avoid if it is to achieve its remedial purposes.
Before December 5, 1980, the principal means of protecting
the Basin's fish and wildlife resources was through the Fish and
Wildlife Coordination Act.2 0 The basic goal of the Coordination
15. See COMMERCE REPORT, supra note 14, at 45.
16. Id. at 48: "Existing federal legislation is not adequate to offset the cumulative impact of hydroelectric dams of the Columbia and its tributaries on fish and
wildlife."
17. See, e.g., the repeated use of the word "enhance" in 16 U.S.C. §§
839(3)(A), (6), 839b(e)(2), (h)(1)(A), (B), (h)(2)(A), (B), (C), (h)(5), (h)(7)(C),
(h)(8)(A), (h)(10)(A), (h)(11)(A)(i), (ii), 839d(i)(2) (Supp. IV 1980). See also
§ 4(h)(1)(A) of the Act which expressly recognizes the unique history of problems
caused by hydropower's effect on fisheries; and § 4(h)(6)(E)(i), (ii) which requires
that the 4(h) Program result in "improved" production, migration, and survival of
anadromous fish. 16 U.S.C. § 839b(h)(6)(E)(i), (ii) (Supp. IV 1980).
18. See, e.g., 126 CONG. REC. H10,680 (daily ed. Nov. 17, 1980) (remarks of
Rep. Dingell upon presenting S. 885, as amended, to the House for approval): "If
the fish populations of the Pacific Northwest are to be restored to the sportsmen,
the Indians and the commercial fishermen, this is the mechanism which will do
it." See also COMMERCE REPORT, supra note 14, at 49 (noting that some "past
mistakes" can be corrected by the law and that "clear regulatory authority will be
needed to protect and rejuvenate the fish and wildlife resources of the region").
19. See, e.g., § 4(h)(2)(A) (Council to request recommended measures to protect, mitigate, and enhance fish and wildlife affected by hydroelectric project development and operation); § 4(h)(8)(A) (enhancement measures authorized as
"compensation for losses arising from the development and operation of hydroelectric facilities"); § 4(h)(8)(B) (consumers of electric power to "bear the cost of
measures designed to deal with adverse impacts caused by the development and
operation of electric power facilities"); § 4(h)(10)(A) (BPA to use its fund and
authorities to protect, mitigate, and enhance fish and wildlife "to the extent affected by the development and operation of any hydroelectric project"). 16 U.S.C.
§§ 839b(h)(2)(A), (h)(8)(A), h(8)(B), (h)(10)(A) (Supp. IV 1980).
20. 16 U.S.C. §§ 661-666i (1976 & Supp. IV 1980). See, e.g., Hydropower vs.
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Act is to provide fish and wildlife "equal consideration" in water
project planning and development with other project purposes."1
The means to achieve this goal is a consultation procedure between federal and state fisheries agencies and federal water managers.22 The ends of the consultation process may include (1) alterations of water projects which reduce adverse effects on fish
and wildlife, (2) mitigation measures aimed at compensating for
unavoidable adverse effects, or (3) studies designed to determine
the extent of adverse effects and the best means of compensating
28
for them.

The Coordination Act failed to reach its goals regarding Columbia Basin fish and wildlife primarily for three reasons. First,
although Congress directed that mitigation measures recommended by fish and wildlife agencies were to be given "full consideration" by federal water managers, the water management
agencies could effectively reject the recommended mitigation
measures if they determined them to be "unjustifiable" in terms
of the goal of maximizing "overall project benefits."' 4 Thus, the
congressional goal of internalizing fish and wildlife costs as an integral part of total project costs was thwarted by giving too much
discretion to agencies which often perceived mitigation as conflicting with their missions.2
Second, it was often impossible to ascertain the extent of fish
and wildlife losses until after a project had been placed in operation. By placing the burden on fish and wildlife agencies to document these losses, water managers could justify limiting fish and
wildlife measures to losses proved at the time of project approval.
The result was that the implementation of effective mitigation
was often delayed until long after project approval. By deferring
one element of project costs, this process not only allowed project
proponents to underestimate the costs of projects, it also effecNATURAL RESOURCES LAW INSTITUTE, 6
ANADROMOUS FISH LAW MEMO (Mar. 1980) for a more detailed discussion of the

Salmon, supra note 9, at 268-76; and

Coordination Act and its legacy in the Columbia Basin.
21. 16 U.S.C. § 661 (1976).
22. Id. § 662(a).
23. See generally, FISH AND WILDLIFE SERV., U.S.

DEP'T OF THE INTERIOR,

WATER RESOURCES PLANNING UNDER THE FISH AND WILDLIFE COORDINATION ACT

(FWS/OBS 80/44 Aug. 1980).
24. 16 U.S.C. § 662(c) (1976).

25. See Hydropower vs. Salmon, supra note 9, at 271-74.
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tively frustrated many mitigation efforts, especially where separate, subsequent congressional approval was required.
Third, the mitigation measures (generally hatcheries 2 ) the
Coordination Act precipitated were disproportionately situated in
the lower Basin.2 7 Locating the hatcheries in the lower Basin removed the hatchery fish from the adverse effects of water project
development in the upper Basin, and thus might have been justified on efficiency grounds. However, these locational decisions
yielded unacceptable distributive consequences, depriving treaty
Indians, upriver sportsmen, and Idahoans of much of the runs
upon which they historically depended.
The Power and Conservation Act addresses all three failures
of the Coordination Act: it removes from federal water managers
the discretion to judge the merits of mitigation measures; it imposes a time deadline on the development of a comprehensive remedial program to effectuate such measures; and it recognizes the
importance of preserving and restoring upriver resources by expressly requiring that the 4(h) Program be consistent with Indian
treaty rights.2 In short, Congress responded to past failures (1)
by significantly restructuring water management decisionmaking
authority, (2) dramatically accelerating the time frame for making
decisions, and (3) directing that long overdue fish and wildlife
protection and compensation be designed to benefit those who
26. Heavy reliance on hatcheries to compensate for fish and wildlife losses
focused attention on procurement of substitute resources rather than minimizing
adverse impacts through operation controls or design alterations. Note that the
Council on Environmental Quality's regulations implementing the National Environmental Policy Act define "mitigation" to include (1) avoiding impacts by not
undertaking the proposed action; (2) minimizing the impact by limiting the degree
or magnitude of the action; (3) rectifying the impact by repairing, rehabilitating,
or restoring the affected environment; (4) reducing or eliminating the impact
through operational controls; or (5) compensating for the impact by replacing or
providing substitute resources. 40 C.F.R. § 1508.20 (1981). For an argument that
mitigation should be a required element in all NEPA analyses, see Houck, Judicial Review Under the Fish and Wildlife CoordinationAct: A Plaintiff's Guide to
Litigation, 11 ENVTL. L. REP. (ENVTL. L. INST.) 50,043, 50,045 (1981); see also 40
C.F.R. § 1502.14(f) (1981).
27. See, e.g., Columbia River Inter-Tribal Fish Comm'n, The Mitchell Act:
An Analysis 11-12 (June 1981).
28. 16 U.S.C. § 8396(h)(5)(C) (Supp. IV 1980). See also id. § 839g(e) and the
provisions cited at supra note 19, which implicitly require compensation for the
particular fish and wildlife resources lost due to hydroelectric project development
and operation.
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had lost the most: the upriver users. Congressional dissatisfaction
with the Coordination Act and its unmistakable intent to alter
substantially old ways of doing business strongly influences this
Article's analysis of 4(h) Program approval issues, such as the
meaning of "best available scientific knowledge" and "minimum
economic cost."' 29
III.

AN OVERVIEW OF THE 4(H) PROGRAM APPROVAL STANDARDS

Section 4(h) of the Power and Conservation Act represents
the principal, although not the only,3s means of fulfilling the Act's
purpose of protecting, mitigating, and enhancing Columbia Basin
fish and wildlife. 1 The Fish and Wildlife Program will result
from a pluralistic intergovernmental and public review process.
Section 4(h)(2) directs the Regional Council to initiate this process "promptly after the Council is established" by soliciting recommendations from the region's federal and state fish and wildlife agencies and Indian tribes. 3 ' After receiving these agency and
tribal recommendations, and any others that are submitted
within the prescribed time period,38 the Council must (1) give
public notice of the recommendations;3 ' (2) make them publicly
available;35 (3) provide an opportunity for public review, with
29. See infra text accompanying notes 89-156.
30. For example, § 4(e)(2) indicates that the regional energy plan as a whole
must protect, mitigate, and enhance fish and wildlife, including adequate stream
flows (16 U.S.C. § 839b(e)(2) (Supp. IV 1980)); section 4(e)(3)(D) requires that
fish and wildlife needs be taken into account in developing 20-year demand forecasts (16 U.S.C. § 839b(e)(3)(D) (Supp. IV 1980)); section 6(i)(2) requires that all
resource acquisitions and billing credits contracts must protect, mitigate, and enhance fish and wildlife (16 U.S.C. § 839d(i)(2) (Supp. IV 1980)); section 10(e)
states that nothing in the Act will be construed to affect or modify Indian Treaty
rights, including fishing and hunting rights (16 U.S.C. § 839g(e) (Supp. IV 1980)).
31. Id. § 839(6). The Fish and Wildlife Program authorized by § 4(h) of the
Act is limited to the Columbia Basin by § 4(h)(1)(B). Id. § 839b(h), (h)(1)(B).
However, the House Interior Committee Report states that non-Columbia Basin
fish and wildlife will be protected by other provisions of the Act, presumably those
provisions cited at supra note 30. See HousE INTERIOR REPORT, supra note 3, at
38.
32. 16 U.S.C. § 839b(h)(2) (Supp. IV 1980).
33. Section 4(h)(3) states that the recommendations are due 90 days after the
Council's request, unless the Council extends the time period. The Council employed this authority to grant a 60-day extension until November 15, 1981. See
supra note 13.
34. Section 4(h)(4)(A), 16 U.S.C. § 839b(h)(4)(A) (Supp. IV 1980).
35. Id.
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both oral and written comment;"' and (4) consult with the fish
and wildlife agencies and Indian tribes, federal agencies responsible for managing, operating, or regulating Columbia Basin dams,
and the owners and operators of these dams. 7 Since Congress did
not specify the precise process by which the Council is to transform these recommendations into a 4(h) Program, the Council
has considerable discretion." However, it must approve a program within one year of receiving the recommendations.8 '
36. Section 4(h)(4)(B), 16 U.S.C.A. § 839b(h)(4)(B) (West Supp. 1981). Since
Congress did not require hearings to be held "on the record," formal, trial-type
hearings, with cross examination and rebuttal evidence, are not required. United
States v. Florida East Coast Railway, 410 U.S. 224 (1973). Cf. § 6(c)(1)(B), 16
U.S.C. § 839d(c)(1)(B) (Supp. IV 1980) (cross examination and rebuttal evidence
in hearings on BPA's major resource acquisitions); and § 7(i)(2)(A) and (B), 16
U.S.C. § 839e(i)(2)(A) (Supp. IV 1980) (cross examination and rebuttal evidence
in hearings on BPA's rates).
37. Section 4(h)(5), 16 U.S.C. § 839b(h)(5) (Supp. IV 1980). See also §
4(h)(7), 16 U.S.C. § 839(b)(h)(7) (Supp. IV 1980) (consultation when resolving inconsistent recommendations). The consultation requirements might be interpreted
to allow the Council the latitude to formulate the contents of the program on the
basis of off-the-record consultation. However, a better interpretation of congressional intent, particularly in light of the Act's strong public participation directives (see infra note 38), may be to conclude that the Regional Council must base
its program on the written record. Such an interpretation would enable interested
parties to respond to the evidence upon which the Act requires the program to be
based. It is possible that a court might require the Council's program to be based
on the written evidence submitted to it, either on the basis of congressional intent
or on common law notions of justice. See 1 K. DAvIs, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE § 6.5, at 462 (2d ed. 1978). This interpretation is strengthened by the requirement in § 4(h)(7) that the Council must make written findings if it decides to
deviate from submitted recommendations (16 U.S.C. § 839b(h)(7) (Supp. IV
1980)). Confining the Council's program to the written administrative record
should not inhibit the Council from "consulting" with the agencies, tribes, and
customers. It would only require that such consultation be memorialized in
writing.
38. See § 4(h)(4)(B), 16 U.S.C. § 839b(h)(4)(B) (Supp. IV 1980). The Regional Council is not statutorily required to draft a proposed program for public
review and comment, but it plans to do so. This welcome development is consistent with the Act's public participation purpose. Id. § 839(3). See also § 4(g), 16
U.S.C. § 839b(g) (Supp. IV 1980) (Council and BPA to maintain comprehensive
public involvement programs concerning major regional power issues).
39. Section 4(h)(9), 16 U.S.C. § 839b(h)(9) (Supp. IV 1980). This provision
requires the Regional Council to adopt the Fish and Wildlife Program "or amendments thereto" within one year of the date on which the fisheries agencies and
tribal recommendations were submitted. It is not clear what is intended by the
language providing for amendments. It might mean that the Council could adopt
an interim program and then amend it within the one-year deadline. However, a
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Voluminous fish and wildlife recommendations were submitted to
the Council on November 15, 1981.0
What constitutes a "recommendation" is of potential signifibetter interpretation is that Congress foresaw the need for periodic amendments
to the program.
40. See Fishery Agency and Tribal 4(h) Recommendations, supra note 13, at
preface. The key recommendation made by the agencies and Indian tribes concerns mainstem streamflows needed to help transport downstream migrating juvenile anadromous fish to the ocean during the spring. These streamflows are necessary to replace the loss of the spring freshet, due to the completion of a number of
upper Columbia Basin storage reservoirs in the 1970's. See supra text accompanying notes 9-10. Most of the fish and wildlife agencies have recommended the implementation of a variable regime of "minimum" flows which would peak at
220,000 cubic feet per second (cfs) at The Dalles Dam during the month of May.
However, these "minimum" flows would be subject to cutbacks of up to 25% during dry water years, while increasing in better-than-average water years. Id. at
178-86. On the other hand, the tribes recommend peak flows of 300,000 cfs. Id. at
170. This divergence is not based on biological disagreements. The agencies agree
that "if optimal biological considerations are used, the minimum flow recommended at The Dalles would be 300,000 cfs." Id. at 169. However, they based their
recommendations on what they believed the power system could accommodate:
Under current power system operations, flows of 300,000 cfs or more would
be extremely difficult to achieve without significant reduction of hydroelectric generation. Based on these power considerations, the optimal biological
flows are not being recommended for the short term but rather the
minimum flow level of 220,000 cfs at The Dalles with corresponding
minimum flows in the Mid Colunibia and Snake Rivers; this flow level falls
at the low end of the range of moderate flows, and would still result in
mortality of approximately 90%. Flow levels lower than 220,000 cfs have
not been considered acceptable, since they would result in fish mortalities
greater than 90% and survival lower than 10%, with corresponding impacts
on commercial, recreational and tribal fisheries.
It is important to stress that the flows recommended in this document
are minimum flows based on current biological knowledge, current power
system constraints, and current storage capacity and allocation. Higher flow
levels, up to the 300,000 cfs or greater optimal flow, may be required based
on new fish survival data, new flexibility in the power system, or changes
in water availability. The objective for future development of the Columbia
River Power System should be operations that allow the minimum spring
flows to be met or exceeded in all years.
Id. (emphasis added).
For an overview of the importance of flows to the fish runs, see Hydropower vs.
Salmon, supra note 9, at 220-22. Notably, the agencies and tribes have rejected
artificial transportation by truck or barge as an alternative to streamflows: "[Artificial] transportation is to be regarded only as a supplement; [it] cannot be regarded as an acceptable alternative to either bypass systems or flows." Fishery
Agency and Tribal 4(h) Recommendations, supra note 13, at 339.
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cance. The Act anticipates that recommendations will be adopted
as part of the program unless the Council adopts more protective

measures than those recommended or makes written findings of
inconsistency with the substantive statutory standards discussed
below.4' The statute describes the contents of recommendations
only in general terms,42 but it does require that they "be accompanied by detailed information and data. '48 However, the Act
does not address the question of whether recommendations ini-

tially submitted without detailed supporting data can later be
amended to satisfy this requirement."
While Congress left many of the details of the program approval process to the Council's discretion, it was much clearer
about the program's contents. The Act establishes ten substantive

standards for 4(h) Program measures and requires the Council to
make a consistency determination with each standard. These
standards, contained in sections 4(h)(5)-(7) of the Act, require the
4(h) Program to:
(1) be based on the submitted recommendations, supporting docu41. Section 4(h)(7), 16 U.S.C. § 839b(h)(7) (Supp. IV 1980); see also infra
note 56 and accompanying text.
42. Id. § 839b(h)(2). Three types of recommendations are mentioned in §
4(h)(2):
1. "measures" to protect, mitigate, and enhance fish and wildlife affected by
the development and operation of Columbia Basin hydroelectric
projects-these measures are to be implemented by the BPA and other federal water managers, such as the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, the Bureau
of Reclamation, and the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission;
2. objectives for the development and operation of these projects in a manner that protects, mitigates, and enhances fish and wildlife; and
3. fish and wildlife management coordination and research and development that will assist in protecting, mitigating, and enhancing, anadromous
fish at and between the region's hydroelectric dams.
43. Id. Citing pertinent portions of the legislative history, the fishery agency
and tribal recommendations assert that this requirement is intended only to provide a basis for understanding the recommendations; it was not intended "as a
rigid measure of the sufficiency of fish and wildlife recommendations." See Fishery Agency and Tribal 4(h) Recommendations, supra note 13, at 29. See also discussion of the definition of "best available scientific knowledge," infra text accompanying notes 89-120.
44. Submissions that do not meet the statutory requirements for recommendations may be considered by the Council in developing the program (§ 4(h)(5), 16
U.S.C. § 839b(h)(5) (Supp. IV 1980)), but the Regional Council need not make
consistency determinations or written findings of inconsistency, as it must with
recommendations. See in/ra notes 56 & 59 and accompanying text.
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ments, public comments, and consultation with fish and wildlife
agencies, Indian tribes, federal water managers, and BPA
customers;16
(2) protect, mitigate, and enhance fish and wildlife affected by the
development and operation of Columbia Basin hydroelectric facilities, while assuring an adequate, efficient, economical, and reliable
6
power supply;'
(3) include enhancement measures where designed to achieve im7
proved protection and mitigation;
(4) complement existing and future activities of federal, state, and
48
tribal fisheries agencies;
(5) be based on, and supported by, best available scientific
knowledge;' 9
(6) utilize the alternative with minimum economic cost where there
are equally effective alternative means of achieving the same sound
biological objective; 50
(7) be consistent with Indian treaty rights;8 '
(8) provide improved survival of anadromous fish bypassing hydroelectric dams;'
(9) provide anadromous fish flows of sufficient quality and quantity
to improve production, migration, and survival as necessary to
meet sound biological objectives;88
(10) be otherwise consistent with the purposes of the Act."
Fish and Wildlife Program provisions concerning resident fish
and wildlife must meet all of these standards except Nos. 8 and
9.55

45. 16 U.S.C. § 839b(h)(5)(A) (Supp. IV 1980).
46. Id.
47. Id. In conjunction with general principle No. 1 (see infra note 60 and
accompanying text), this limits approvable enhancement measures to those justified as compensation for past or continuing fish and wildlife losses.
48. 16 U.S.C. § 839b(h)(6)(A) (Supp. IV 1980).
49. Id. § 839b(h)(6)(B).
50. Id. § 839b(h)(6)(C).
51. Id. § 839b(h)(6)(D).

52. Id. § 839b(h)(6)(E)(i).
53. Id. § 839b(h)(6)(E)(ii).
54. Id. § 839b(h)(7). This may not actually be a separate program standard,
since it is not expressly listed as one of the bases upon which the Regional Council
can base a rejection of a recommendation. See id. § 839b(h)(7)(A)-(C). As a practical matter, the balancing implicitly required in standard No. 2 embodies the principal tradeoff among the Act's purposes.
55. Although all the provisions of the Act are to be construed in a consistent
manner (see infra text accompanying note 65), if there are potential conflicts between anadromous fish measures (e.g., minimum flows) and resident fish and wild-
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These program approval standards supply considerable congressional guidance concerning the nature and content of the Fish
and Wildlife Program, and are clearly designed to confine and
structure the Council's discretion. The Council is required to
make written findings of inconsistency with the standards if it decides not to adopt any recommendation submitted to it.5 The
Council can also reject recommendations if it finds that the provisions it adopts would more effectively protect, mitigate, and enhance fish and wildlife.5 7 The burden is on the Council to explain
the basis of its inconsistency determinations. In other words, recommendations enjoy a rebuttable presumption of consistency
with the standards.
The Council has the authority to "resolve inconsistencies"
among the recommendations it receives, but it must give "due
weight to the recommendations, expertise, legal rights and responsibilities" of the fisheries agencies and the tribes." This provision may indicate that Congress intended that in doubtful cases
the Council should defer to the expertise of the fisheries agencies
and the tribes. In addition, the Act requires the Council to determine affirmatively that each measure included in its program satisfies the program approval standards.5 9
In addition to the ten program approval standards, section
4(h)(8) of the Act directs the Council to consider four general
principles in developing and approving the Fish and Wildlife Prolife measures, arguably the former take precedence. The preeminence of
anadromous fish measures follows from greater specificity of the anadromous fish
standards and Congress's primary concern for anadromous fish (see, e.g., supra
text accompanying note 15 and the Act's fish and wildlife purpose: "to protect,
mitigate, and enhance the fish and wildlife including related spawning grounds
and habitat, of the Columbia River and its tributaries, particularlyanadromous
fish." 16 U.S.C. § 839(6) (Supp. IV 1980) (emphasis added).
56. Id. 16 U.S.C. § 839b(h)(7) (Supp. IV 1980).
57. Id. § 839b(h)(7)(C).
58. Id. § 839b(h)(7). It also must consult with appropriate entities. See supra
text accompanying note 37.
59. Such determinations are explicitly required by § 4(h)(6), (7), but written
findings are expressly required only of findings of inconsistency. Id. § 839b(h)(6),
(7). However, written findings of consistency would considerably facilitate public
understanding of why the Council believes its program meets the statutory standards. In light of the strong public participation mandates of the Act, the Council
should make written affirmative consistency determinations with each of the program approval standards based on the written administrative record compiled
during the program approval process, when it adopts its 4(h) Program.
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gram. First, where necessary to compensate for past losses due to
the development and operation of the hydroelectric system, enhancement measures are appropriate. 0 Second, electric power
consumers are to bear only the costs of adverse impacts caused by
the development and operation of the hydroelectric system."'
Third, where the 4(h) Program provides for coordination of its
measures with additional non-4(h) fish and wildlife initiatives
(e.g., those not attributable to the development and operation of
the hydroelectric system), the additional measures are to be implemented according to agreements that specify how these measures are to be funded and administered. 2 Fourth, BPA is to allocate monetary costs and power losses consistent with individual
project impacts and system-wide objectives."
Because these are only "principles" that the Council must
take into account in developing and approving the Fish and Wildlife Program, they are not as significant as the ten program standards previously described. No consistency determinations or
written findings are required for these general considerations.
Nevertheless, the principles help clarify some of the principal
means by which Congress intended the program to be implemented: (1) offsite enhancement measures, (2) increased electric
power rates, (3) coordination agreements, and (4) electric power
losses. These principles also help resolve some of the specific program approval issues addressed in section V of this Article.
IV.

FISHERIES/HYDROPOWER BALANCING AND THE PRINCIPLE OF
TEXTUAL CONSISTENCY

The substantive program approval standards listed above
could be interpreted to conflict with each other. For example,
standard No. 2 (protect, mitigate, and enhance fish and wildlife
while assuring an adequate, efficient, economical, and reliable
power supply) may be viewed as inconsistent with other standards, such as standard No. 4 (complement existing and future
activities of fish and wildlife agencies and tribes), standard No. 6
(achieve sound biological objectives at minimum economic cost),
60. Id. § 839b(h)(8)(A).

61. Id. § 839b(h)(8)(B).
62. Id. § 839b(h)(8)(C).
63. Id. § 839b(h)(8)(D). This provision is one of the few in § 4(h) that BPA is
responsible for implementing. See also infra note 75.
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and particularly standard No. 7 (be consistent with Indian treaty
rights). While such an interpretation is possible under the terms
of the Act,"" it is an avoidable, strained reading of congressional
intent. Because the standards were designed to be construed in a
consistent manner, the balance that must be struck between
fisheries protection and hydropower generation should not conflict with complementing fishery agency and tribal activities, with
achieving sound biological objectives, with protecting Indian
treaty rights, or with any of the other program approval standards. Potential conflicts among the standards can be avoided if
the Council defines the balancing implied in standard No. 2 to
embody the more specific program standards.
This "Principle of Textual Consistency" was expressly
adopted by Congress in the first sentences of the Power and Conservation Act. Section 2 states that: "[tihe purposes of this Act,
together with the provisions of other laws applicable to the Federal Columbia River Power System, are all intended to be construed in a consistent manner. Such purposes are also intended to
be construed in a manner consistent with applicable environmental laws." 5 If the purposes of the Act must be construed in a consistent manner, then certainly the approval standards for the Fish
and Wildlife Program, one of the two principal tasks Congress assigned to the Regional Council,66 should be similarly construed.
This is particularly true of standard No. 2, which essentially combines two of the six purposes of the Act. 7
The Principle of Textual Consistency means that where the
text of the statute includes both vague and specific program standards, the vague standards should be construed as consistent with
more specific standards. This is by no means a revolutionary con64. Section 4(h)(7) allows the Regional Council to reject proferred recommendations on three separate grounds: findings of inconsistency with either § 4(h)(5)
(embodying standard Nos. 1-3) or § 4(h)(6) (embodying standard Nos. 4-9), or a
finding that the proferred measures would be less effective than the measures it
chooses to adopt in terms of protecting, mitigating, and enhancing fish and wildlife. 16 U.S.C. § 839b(h)(7) (Supp. IV 1980). Implicit in these three alternative
grounds of rejection is the notion that a recommendation might be consistent with
some of the program approval standards, yet conflict with others.

65. Id. § 839.
66. Section 4(e)(4) states that the Regional Council is to devote its principal
energies to the Fish and Wildlife Program and the electric conservation and power
plan. Id. § 839b(e)(4).

67. Id. § 839(2), (6).
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cept; it is a time-honored and fundamental principle of statutory
construction. 8 By specifically reiterating this principle in the text
of the Act, Congress recognized the possibility that some program
standards might be construed as inconsistent with other standards, and expressly cautioned against, though concededly it did
not absolutely forbid, such a result s
To apply the principle, it is necessary to determine which
standards are flexible and which are specific. Standard No. 2 appears to be the most flexible because the balancing it anticipates
is notably absent from the other program approval standards. For
example, the Council is not directed to develop a 4(h) Program
that complements existing and future activities of the region's
fish and wildlife agencies and Indian tribes (standard No. 4) "to
the maximum extent practicable," or is consistent with treaty
rights (standard No. 7) "where appropriate." On the contrary,
there are mandatory directives.
Applying the principle gives definition to an "adequate, efficient, economical and reliable power supply. '70 Such a power supply is one that accommodates the specific approval standards
listed in subsections 4(h)(5)-(7). It is one which is compatible
with ongoing and future fish and wildlife agency and tribal activities, achieves sound biological objectives (including sufficient fish
flows and bypass facilities), and is consistent with Indian treaty
rights.7 1 Such a result is justified because Congress clearly
68. See, e.g., G.FOLSOM,

17 (1972);
§ 46.05 (4th ed. 1972).

LEGISLATIVE HISTORY

LAND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION

C. SANDS, SUTHER-

69. See supra note 64.

70. 16 U.S.C. § 839b(h)(5) (Supp. IV 1980).
71. In a recent legal analysis submitted to the Regional Council, the PNUCC
in effect argues that the specific standards should be construed to accommodate

the vague standard. In other words, the balancing test should be interpreted as an
ingredient of "complementing existing and future agency and tribal activities,"
"achieving sound biological objectives," and "being consistent with treaty rights."
PACIFIC NORTHWEST UTILITIES CONFERENCE COMM., DEGREE OF POWER COUNCIL
FLEXIBILITY IN RESPONDING TO FISHERY AGENCY RECOMMENDATIONS FOR DEVELOPMENT AND ADOPTION OF A FISH AND WILDLIFE PROGRAM 5 (n.d.) [hereinafter cited

as PNUCC ANALYSIS].
PNUCC's argument is grounded on the fact that § 4(h)(6) of the Act states
that program approval standard Nos. 4-9 must be judged "on the basis set forth
in [§ 4(h)(5)]," which includes the fisheries-hydropower balancing. 16 U.S.C.
§ 839b(h)(6) (Supp. IV 1980). A better interpretation of this language is that it
refers only to the directive in § 4(h)(5) that "the Council shall develop a program
on the basis of [the] recommendations, supporting documents," etc. submitted to
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intended that the power system would make substantial accommodations to repay its debt to the region's fish and wildlife resources. Section 2(4) states that one of the purposes of the Act is
to assure that users of electricity continue to pay all the costs
required to produce, transmit, and conserve resources necessary
to meet the region's electric power requirements.7" The House
Commerce Report s and section 4(h)(8)(B) of the Act 7 4 make

clear that these costs include fish and wildlife costs. Further, section 4(h)(8)(D) expressly anticipates electric power losses due to
75
the implementation of the Council's Fish and Wildlife Program.
In addition, section 6(i)(2) requires internalization of fish and
wildlife costs in all resource acquisition and billing credit
76
decisions.
As a result, an "adequate, efficient, economical and reliable
power supply ' 77 must be defined as one that includes the cost of
providing long overdue accommodations to the Basin's fish and
wildlife resources. It must internalize all of the fish and wildlife
costs associated with developing and operating the hydropower
it (emphasis added). In other words, the reference in § 4(h)(6) is to program
approval standard No. 1, not to the entirety of § 4(h)(5), which also includes standards No. 2 (balancing) and No. 3 (enhancement measures). In order to accept the
PNUCC rationale, one must infer (1) that existing and future activities of fish and
wildlife agencies and Indian tribes include power generation, (2) that achieving
sound biological objectives includes hydropower considerations, and (3) that consistency with Indian treaty rights includes hydropower balancing. All of these inferences are improbable, and, as noted infra text accompanying notes 157-89, the
third inference conflicts with numerous federal court decisions.
72. 16 U.S.C. § 839(4) (Supp. IV 1980).

73.

COMMERCE REPORT,

supra note 14, at 49.

74. "Consumers of electric power shall bear the costs of measures designed to
deal with adverse impacts caused by the development and operation of electric
power facilities and programs only." 16 U.S.C. § 839b(h)(8)(B) (Supp. IV 1980).
75. "Monetary costs and electric power losses resulting from the implementation of the program shall be allocated by the Administrator consistent with individual project impacts and system-wide objectives of this subsection." Id. §
839b(h)(8)(D). This provision indicates that the allocation of 4(h) Program financing is a BPA responsibility. See also § 6(a)(2)(B) (BPA to acquire necessary resources to implement the 4(h) Program); id. § 839h(a)(2)(B); § 8(d)(1) (enlarging
BPA's bonding authority to include fish and wildlife costs); and § 7(a)(1) (BPA's
rates to include "other costs and expenses incurred by the Administrator pursuant
to this Act.")
76. 16 U.S.C. § 839d(i)(2) (Supp. IV. 1980).
77. Id. § 839b(h)(5).
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system. 8 This interpretation is supported by representations that
power interests made to Congress concerning their intentions to
accommodate fish and wildlife concerns if the Act passed. BPA
and others persuaded the House Commerce Committee that there
would be no conflict between assuring an economical and reliable
power supply and restoring the Basin's fish and wildlife resources:
The Committee also believes that BPA and others in the region,
including so-called "power interests," concerned with meeting the
power needs of the region have in recent times become more concerned about these valuable natural resources. They testified that
they are anxious to accommodate fish and wildlife needs. The
Committee believes that this is a hopeful sign and that this bill will

help to achieve what appears to 7be a common objective of protecting and enhancing this resource.

9

In these statements the power interests themselves seem to have
adopted the accommodations, at least in their representations
before Congress, that are inherent in the Principle of Textual
Consistency."0
The Principle of Textual Consistency requires all feasible
power accommodations to satisfy the more specific 4(h) Program
approval standards. However, the Act's legislative history also indicates that "unreasonable power shortages or loss of power revenues" are not required. 81 Power interests may therefore try to defeat the assumption of consistency among the program approval
standards by demonstrating that such unreasonable results will
78. See Promising Parity, supra note 12, at 507-08, 521-22.
79. COMMERCE REPORT, supra note 14, at 49 (emphasis added).
80. Willingness to accommodate fish and wildlife needs has not been a particularly high priority for power interests in the past. In fact, the failure of the Coordination Act can be attributed in no small measure to power interest claims that
they lacked legal authority to protect fish and wildlife, or that the fish and wildlife
agencies could not "prove" that power operations were damaging to fish and wildlife resources. See, e.g., Hydropower vs. Salmon, supra note 9, at 221-22, 256-57,
298. It is hard to resist drawing an analogy between these "lack of proof" arguments and similar utility arguments disclaiming accountability for acid rain damage, allegedly due to emissions from coal-fired power plants. See generally Acid
Rain: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Oversight and Investigations of the
House Comm. on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 96 Cong., 1st Sess. (1980).
These utility arguments have apparently persuaded the Reagan Administration
EPA that more research on the causes and effects of acid rain must precede any
regulatory action. See N.Y. Times, Feb. 9, 1982, at C3, col. 1.
81. COMMERCE REPORT, supra note 14, at 57.
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occur. But Congress intended to place a heavy burden upon those
who seek to make such a demonstration: the House Commerce
Committee stated that "cost should not be a deterrent if a fish
and wildlife need might be sacrificed to save dollars.""2
A logical interpretation of the text and legislative history of
the Act observes the Principle of Textual Consistency by placing
the burden of proof on the power interests. The text of the statute anticipates power losses and increased costs. The legislative
history forbids unreasonable power shortages and unreasonable
losses of power revenues, yet states that saving dollars is not a
justifiable reason for rejecting fish and wildlife measures.8 3 These
statements should be interpreted to mean that the Principle of
Textual Consistency can only be defeated if there are demonstrated large scale power shortages (not simply increased power
costs) or a demonstrated BPA inability to fulfill the self-financing
requirement imposed by the Federal Columbia Transmission System Act.84 Placing this burden on power interests will provide
considerable incentives to "devise effective and imaginative measures" 85 that will protect and restore fish and wildlife without
jeopardizing the region's power supply.
Placing the burden on power managers to accommodate fish
and wildlife needs is warranted because the managers' past actions have systematically disenfranchised fish and wildlife. Further, imposing this burden is justified by the kind of tradeoff implied by section 4(h)(5). That provision states: "[tihe [4(h)]
program shall consist of measures to protect, mitigate, and enhance fish and wildlife affected by the development, operation
and management of [hydroelectric] facilities while assuring the
Pacific Northwest an adequate, efficient, economical, and reliable
power supply."" Notably, Congress did not state that the Council
was to assure an adequate, efficient, economical, and reliable hydropower supply; the Act does not specify what type of power
supply must be provided. Further, hydropower losses were specifically anticipated in section 4(h)(8)(D) of the Act.8 7 This is a rea82.
83.
84.
85.
86.
87.

Id.
See supra text accompanying notes 81-82.
16 U.S.C. § 838g (1976 & Supp. IV 1980).
COMMERCE REPORT, supra note 14, at 57.
16 U.S.C. § 839b(h)(5) (Supp. IV 1980) (emphasis added).
Id. § 839b(h)(8)(D). See supra note 75 and accompanying text.
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sonable policy choice because hydropower is replaceable with
"cost-effective" resource acquisitions under section 6 of the Act."
On the other hand, the region's fish and wildlife resources, particularly its depleted upriver anadromous fish runs, are not replaceable. The accommodations must now come from the hydropower
resource; Congress recognized that the fish and wildlife resource
simply can no longer supply the accommodations.
V.

INTERPRETING SOME OF THE SPECIFIC PROGRAM APPROVAL
STANDARDS

According to the Principle of Textual Consistency, the ten
program standards should generally reinforce, not override, each
other. Consequently, an examination of some of the more specific
standards will help define the balancing of fish and wildlife resources and hydropower that Congress anticipated in standard
No. 2. This section analyzes three of the specific standards: the
directives to employ best available scientific knowledge, to
achieve sound biological objectives at minimum economic cost,
and to protect Indian treaty rights.
A.

The Definition of "Best Available Scientific Knowledge"

Section 4(h) approval standard No. 5 requires the Council to
base the program on "the best available scientific knowledge."" If
incorrectly interpreted, this provision might serve as the functional equivalent of the term "justifiable," which water managers
used to frustrate the "equal consideration" goal of the Fish and
Wildlife Coordination Act.' 0 Such a result, however, can easily be
avoided.
As the fish and wildlife agencies and Indian tribes point out
in their 4(h) recommendations, the "best available scientific
knowledge" standard was meant to afford the Council and interested parties a rationale for explaining the basis of their recommendations.9' It was certainly not Congress's intent to hold the
fish and wildlife agencies and tribes to a high standard of scientific proof that might delay implementation of effective fish and
88.
89.
90.
91.

Id. § 839d. See supra note 4.
See supra note 49 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 24-25 and accompanying text.
Fishery Agency and Tribal 4(h) Recommendations, supra note 13, at 29.
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wildlife measures. Support for this proposition appears both in
the text of the statute and in the legislative history.
First, the statute imposes a tight timeframe on the submission of fish and wildlife and tribal recommendations. As noted
earlier, these deadlines are a consequence of the remedial nature
of the 4(h) Program: Congress simply lost patience with the protracted fish and wildlife measures provided by the Coordination
Act.9' Instead, it °ordered immediate action designed to produce
substantial relief for the region's depleted fish and wildlife resources. Congressional concern with the region's fish and wildlife
ran so high that Congress ordered the Council to approve the
Fish and Wildlife Program before it approves a regional energy
plan.98 There is no question that in so doing Congress was influenced by the following conclusions reached by the General Accounting Office in a report that was quoted extensively in the legislative history:
[S]ome fish runs have declined to the point of near extinction, and
others are threatened by increasing electric power developments
and irrigation withdrawals. For some upriver fish runs, time is a
criticalfactor. This bill can be an effective vehicle for restoring the
anadromous fisheries. We believe it should be amended to restore
the salmon and steelhead fisheries ....
The time deadlines were a response to what Congress perceived
to be a crisis. This crisis did not "afford an opportunity for extensive studies, the acquisition of new data, or the development of
best scientific knowledge." 9 Instead, it required only best available scientific knowledge, a standard designed to assure action.
"The quantity or quality of the data should not serve as a basis
for turning down any recommendation," because "it is reasonable
92. See supra notes 15-29 and accompanying text.
93. Compare § 4(h)(9) (one year to approve Fish and Wildlife Program) with
§ 4(d)(1) (two years to approve energy plan). 16 U.S.C. § 839b(d)(1), (h)(9) (Supp.
IV 1980). See also COMMERCE REPORT, supra note 14, at 44-46, 57 (because of the
critical condition of many of the Basin's salmon and steelhead runs, the Council
should not delay Fish and Wildlife Program approval pending adoption of the
energy plan); 126 CONG. Rzc. H10,683 (daily ed. Nov. 17, 1980) (remarks of Rep.
Dingell) ("Once the council is appointed and begins to function it must immediately begin to develop and adopt a fish and widlife program. Adoption of the program should not be delayed pending adoption of the plan.")
94. 1979 GAO REPORT, supra note 8, at 24 (emphasis added); see also COMMERCE REPORT, supra note 14, at 45-48.
95. COMMERCE REPORT, supra note 14, at 56.
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to expect organizations with fish and wildlife expertise to be able
easily to provide needed support data .

.

. ."9 Thus, Congress

rejected the tradition of deferring meaningful remedial action
while searching for scientific certainty: instead it determined that
the time for studies had run out.
Second, while the time deadlines require immediate action,
the Principle of Textual Consistency demands that the Council
defer to the recommendations submitted by the region's federal
and state fishery agencies and Indian tribes. Notably, program
approval standard No. 4 requires the Council's program to complement existing and future activities of federal and state fish and
wildlife agencies and Indian tribes. Congress could not have intended that the Council circumscribe these existing and future
activities by rejecting their recommendations on the basis of an
asserted lack of scientific proof.97 Determinations of what constitutes the best available scientific knowledge must therefore be
left largely to those agencies and tribes that have been involved in
managing the resource.
Third, the standard is not best available scientific data, but
best available scientific knowledge. The distinction suggests that
agencies and tribes should have the latitude to draw inferences
and make predictions from their data. Congressman Dingell espoused this principle when he stated that the Council "should
rely heavily on the fish and wildlife agencies of the State and
Federal Governments and not try to become a super fish and
wildlife entity."" Deference is also evident in section 4(h)(7)
which requires that "due weight" be given to the expertise of the
fish and wildlife agencies and tribes and requires that the Council
make written findings if it decides to deviate from those
recommendations."
Fourth, congressional intent that the Council should accede
to the fish and wildlife agency and tribal definition of "best available scientific knowledge" is apparent from congressional refusal
96. Id.
97. Section 10(h) disclaims any intent to "affect the rights or jurisdictions of

the United States, the States, Indian tribes or other entities over waters of any
river or stream." 16 U.S.C. § 839g(h) (Supp. IV 1980).
98. 126 CONG. REC. H10,683 (daily ed. Nov. 17, 1980).
99. 16 U.S.C. § 839b(h)(7) (Supp. IV 1980); see PromisingParity,supra note
12, at 526-27 nn.137-38.
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to define statutorily the terms "protect, mitigate, and enhance."
As the House Commerce Committee explained, "these terms are
not new to those concerned with this resource, and such a definition might later prove more limiting than anticipated."1 00 Congress also specifically considered and rejected a power interest
supported definition of "protect, mitigate, and enhance" tied to
"minimum economic costs and minimum adverse impact on electric power production."101 Therefore, economic costs and power
and production considerations are not relevant to, and have not
been incorporated into, the definitions of "protect, mitigate, and
enhance" proposed by the fish and wildlife agencies and tribes.10 '
Just as Congress expected the Council to defer to the resource
agency and tribal definitions of these terms, Congress expected
the Council to defer to the agencies' and tribes' judgment concerning what constitutes "best available scientific knowledge."
Fifth, deferrence to state agency expertise concerning
Northwest fisheries is supported by precedent. The Regional
Council is institutionally similar to the interstate Pacific Fishery
Management Council, created by the Fishery Conservation and
Management Act of 1976.10 s The Pacific Fishery Management
Council considers the "best scientific information available" to be
"the biological data collected by the state [fisheries] agencies."'"
Given Congress's admonition to the Regional Council not to establish itself as a "super fish and wildlife agency,"105 and the
Council's lack of technical staff and expertise, substantial deference " must be given to those entities with expertise and experisupra note 14, at 57.
101. See Promising Parity, supra note 12, at 521 n.110.
102. The proposed definitions are: 1) "protection"-the conservation and
preservation of habitat and populations, 2) "mitigation"-reducing avoidable
losses and compensating for unavoidable losses, and 3) "enhancement"-a form of
offsite mitigation. Fishery Agency and Tribal 4(h) Recommendations, supra note
13, at 112.
103. 16 U.S.C. §§ 1801-1882 (1976 & Supp. IV 1980). (The Act is now referred
to as the Magnusen Fishery Conservation and Management Act.)
104. See Letter from Lorry Nakatsu, Executive Director, Pacific Fishery
Management Council, to Rep. John Breaux, Chairman, House Subcomm. on Fishery and Wildlife Conservation and the Environment at 3 (Aug. 29, 1980).
105. See supra text accompanying note 98.
106. See Central Lincoln Pub. Util. Dist. v. Johnson, 673 F.2d 1076, 1078 (9th
Cir. 1982) (substantial deference due BPA's contemporaneous construction of the
Power and Conservation Act).
100. COMMERCE REPORT,
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ence regarding the "best available" scientific knowledge: the
tribes and the fish and wildlife agencies.
Finally, in addition to the Fishery Conservation and Management Act, there are numerous other examples of federal statutes
that have ordered administrative agencies to take actions based
on incomplete scientific data. It is instructive to review a few
cases in which the federal courts scrutinized the sufficiency of the
data that formed the basis of various agency decisions. Of course,
the Council is not a court, but in fashioning the 4(h) Program on
the basis of the recommendations submitted to it, the Council
will function much like a reviewing court. These cases should,
therefore, help the Council determine how defensible its program
will be if its provisions are based on the data available to the fish
and wildlife agencies.
One of the leading cases dealing with the sufficiency of scientific data concerned section 211 of the Clean Air Act, which required the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) Administrator to regulate fuel additives if the Administrator determined
107
that auto emissions "will endanger human health or welfare.'
In Ethyl Corporationv. EPA, 0 8 the auto industry challenged regulations EPA chose to impose on use of gasoline lead additives on
the grounds that there was insufficient evidence to justify the regulations. Although the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit acknowledged that the available evidence could
support "any inference one might care to draw," it rejected the
industry's contention that the regulations must be justified by a
factual showing of the actual harm caused by leaded gasoline.
The court upheld the regulations, stating that:
[wihere a statute is precautionary in nature, the evidence difficult
to come by, uncertain, or conflicting because it is on the frontiers
of scientific knowledge, the regulations designed to protect the
public health, and the decision that of an expert administrator, we
will not demand rigorous step-by-step proof of cause and effect. 1'"
107. 42 U.S.C. § 7545(c)(1)(A) (Supp. III 1979). The standard was amended
in the 1977 Amendments, but the amended standard-"which may reasonably be
anticipated to endanger public health or welfare"-was not at issue in the case.
Moreover, the amended standard suggests even more deference to the conclusions
of the expert agency.
108. Ethyl Corp. v. EPA, 541 F.2d 1 (D.C. Cir. 1976).
109. Id. at 28 (footnotes omitted).
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Since "awaiting scientific certainty will often allow for only reactive, not preventive regulation," EPA could apply its expertise to
draw conclusions from data involving suspected or probable relationships and from theoretical projections based on incomplete
data. 110
Ethyl and similar cases"' may have special relevance for the
4(h) Program. For example, the fish and wildlife agencies and Indian tribes are unlikely to be able to prove on the basis of demonstrated factual evidence that the mainstem flows they seek will
result in specific run size increases. There are simply too many
variables and uncertainties involved in the mainstem flow issue.
Regrettably, biological proof is much more difficult to obtain than
the kind of proof that engineers employ in a construction project
or that lawyers seek in a courtroom.11 2 Moreover, since water
managers have never provided fish and wildlife agencies and
tribes with sufficient fish flows in the past, there is no reservoir of
experience from which to draw this kind of scientific evidence. If
the section 4(h) Program is to achieve its goals, the standard necessarily must be something less than scientific certainty.
The Ethyl case indicates that courts will give wide latitude to
administrative agencies that are directed to take immediate action on the basis of incomplete factual data and that have experience in managing the resources they are directed to protect." In
Environmental Defense Fund v. EPA, the District of Columbia
Circuit upheld EPA's prohibition of PCB discharges into the nation's waters largely on the same grounds of deference to agency
110. Id. at 25.
111. See, e.g., Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. Train, 545 F.2d 320
(2d Cir. 1976) (EPA required to establish an ambient air quality standard for lead,
despite protests by the agency that it lacked sufficient scientific information and
the absence of a statutory time deadline for such action).
112. For an illuminating analysis of the differences between scientific and legal proof, see Large & Michie, Proving that the Strength of the British Navy
Depends on the Number of Old Maids in England: A Comparison of Scientific
Proof with Legal Proof, 11 ENVTL. L. 555 (1981).
113. PNUCC, in a recent legal analysis submitted to the Regional Council,
argues that it is the Council, not the fish and wildlife agencies and the tribes, that
warrants such wide latitude from the courts. See PNUCC ANALvsis, supra note
71, at 13-15. This argument ignores the fact that the Council has no experience in
managing the region's fish and wildlife resources and no technical staff. As a result, the Council cannot realistically be considered to be the "expert agency" in
the 4(h) Program approval process.
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expertise."" The court observed that extrapolations from existing
data are appropriate and that EPA need not wait for conclusive
proof of harm. The court also noted that administrative agencies
with technical expertise, not the courts, are to decide what inferences may be drawn from the available evidence and what risks
are acceptable when dealing with matters on the frontiers of scientific knowledge. 15
Cases challenging the EPA national ambient air quality standard for lead and the Occupational Safety and Health Act
(OSHA) workplace standard for benzene emissions reached similar results. In Lead Industries Assoc. v.EPA,"' the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit upheld EPA's lead
standard. The court stated that questions concerning the frontiers of scientific knowledge often require decisions based on policy judgments without "fully informed factual determinations";
these policy choices are not subject to "the same type of verification or refutation by reference to the record as are other factual
questions.' ' 17 In Industrial Union Department v. American Petroleum Institute, the Supreme Court stated that the statutory
provision requiring that OSHA's benzene emission standards be
based "to the extent feasible, on [the] best available evidence"
did not require proof of actual worker harm."' The Court noted
that "the requirement that a 'significant' risk be identified is not
a mathematical straight-jacket; OSHA is not required to support
its finding that a significant risk exists with anything approaching
scientific certainty." The Court also observed that the standard of
"best available evidence" requires judicial deference where determinations on the frontiers of scientific knowledge must be made.
So long as the agency's data is "reputable," the agency may use
conservative assumptions and err on the side of overprotection.'
114. Environmental Defense Fund v. EPA, 598 F.2d 62 (D.C. Cir. 1978).
115. Id. at 68.
116. 647 F.2d 1130 (D.C. Cir. 1980).
117. Id. at 1147 (quoting Industrial Union Dep't v. Hodgson, 449 F.2d 467,
475 (D.C. Cir. 1975)).
118. Industrial Union Dep't v. American Petroleum Inst., 100 S.Ct. 2844,
2863 (1980). For an interesting perspective on the standards of judicial review employed by the sharply divided benzene Court, see Rodgers, Judicial Review of
Risk Assessments; The Role of Decision Theory in Unscrambling the Benzene
Decision, 11 ENVTL. L. 301 (1981).
119. Id. at 2871. After enunciating these guidelines, the Court remanded the
case to OSHA because the agency had failed to justify its promulgated standard

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2956987

19821

FISH AND WILDLIFE PROGRAM

These cases indicate that the Regional Council should reject
attacks on the fish and wildlife agency and tribal flow recommendations if such attacks are based on a lack of proof linking
specific flows to run size improvements. Because the Council's
role in approving the section 4(h) Program is quasi-judicial, the
Council should employ the considerable judicial deference afforded agency determinations based on statutory standards similar to those in the Power and Conservation Act. The fish and
wildlife agencies and tribes must base their flow recommendations on "best available scientific knowledge," but they need not
justify those flows on absolute proof. As the Supreme Court has
stated, only reputable data is required. The fish and wildlife
agencies and tribes may employ conservative assumptions, erring
on the side of overprotection. 2 '
B.

The Meaning of "Achieving Sound Biological Objectives at
Minimum Economic Cost"

Program approval standard No. 6 requires that when two or
more "equally effective means of achieving the same sound biological objective exist," the Council must choose the measure with
the "minimum economic cost."'"2 To apply this standard, it must
be determined how "sound biological objectives" should be defined, whether cost considerations can dictate the choice of less
effective means, what measure of "cost" should be used, and
whether a cost-effectiveness test is inherent in the standard.
Some of the foregoing analysis of "best available scientific
knowledge" is pertinent to a satisfactory interpretation of "sound
biological objectives." Congress did not define "sound biological
objectives" in the Act. Presumably it intended the Council to defer to the agencies' and tribes' definition of this term, just as it
expected deference with respect to "protect, mitigate, and enhance.' 2 When combined with Congress's specific rejection of a
cost-based definition of protect, mitigate, and enhance,'As 4(h)
standard No. 6 indicates that Congress intended biological deterwith a finding that existing workplace conditions posed a "significant risk" to
worker health.
120. Id.
121. See supra note 50 and accompanying text.
122. See supra text accompanying notes 100-02.
123. See supra text accompanying note 101.
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minations to be given more weight than economic considerations.
Economic considerations become relevant only when biological
determinations are satisfied. "Minimum economic costs" implies
a simple common sense standard: obviously, we should not spend
more if spending less will achieve the same biological result.
Those advocating a deviation from the fish and wildlife agency
and tribal flow recommendations on economic cost grounds alone
must bear the burden of proof that their suggestions will indeed
achieve "equally effective" biological results.""
Unlike the preceding discussion of the balancing between fish
and wildlife resources and hydropower in program approval standard No. 2 and its potential for defeating the Principle of Textual
Consistency, 2 3 standard No. 6 does not allow the economic considerations of hydropower generation to override fish and wildlife
protection measures. According to the Principle of Textual Consistency, the more specific standard (No. 6) should be read into
the more general standard (No. 2). As previously noted, this interpretation will narrow considerably the types of situations in
which hydropower costs could override or delay remedial fish and
wildlife measures.
The measures recommended by the fish and wildlife agencies
and tribes designed to achieve the biological objective of improving juvenile migrant survival are derived from past experience
and complex models and are based on predictions of the expected
results of particular flow regimes.1 26 As in the standard of "best
available scientific knowledge," substantial deference should be
124. The "equally effective" standard anticipates a higher standard of proof
than the "best available scientific knowledge" standard discussed in the preceding
section. In order to satisfy the former, the weight, or preponderance, of biological

evidence must favor the least cost alternative; the latter can be satisfied by "reputable" data (see supra text accompanying notes 119-20), a standard resembling a
rational basis. These standards of proof have been misconceived by BPA. See
BONNEVILLE POWER ADMIN., U.S. DEP'T OF ENERGY, COMMENTS TO THE NORTHWEST
POWER PLANNING COUNCIL FOR THE FISH AND WILDLIFE PROGRAM 11 (April 1, 1982)

[hereinafter cited as BPA COMMENTS) (suggesting that transportation of juvenile
salmon downstream by truck or barge, rather than by streamflows, "should continue to be an integral part of the anadromous fish program until it is shown to be

less effective than other methods of insuring improved survival of upriver
stocks.") (emphasis added).
125. See supra notes 30-63 and accompanying text.
126. See Fishery Agency and Tribal 4(h) Recommendations, supra note 13, at
178-207.
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given by the Regional Council to the resource managers' recommended means of "achieving sound biological objectives."
There is judicial support for this conclusion. For example,
emission limits prescribed by the EPA under the Clean Air Act
are developed on the basis of complex and sometimes untested
models that estimate the general air quality effects of pollution
reductions from particular sources. These models are often controversial because of the lack of demonstrated evidence of air
quality results. In Texas v. EPA, 1 7 the Fifth Circuit sustained
the use of an EPA model over the objections of the state and
regulated industries that EPA lacked sufficient supporting data.
The court stated that although the EPA model was based upon
"a simplistic assumption rather than experimental data or proven
theory," the agency's reliance on "crude assumptions" was not arbitrary since EPA lacked sophisticated information." 8 Interestingly, while the court allowed EPA to take action on the basis of
sparse data, it indicated that the agency would be held to a
higher standard as more information became available, imposing
"a continuing responsibility to develop, review, and apply updated and more sophisticated information. 1 2' The fish and wildlife agency and tribal recommendations under section 4(h) seem
to have anticipated such an evolving standard, promising to review carefully the efficacy and sufficiency of their recommended
flows as more data becomes available.130 However, as indicated
above,183 delaying action until complete information on the relationship between fish runs and specific flows can be ascertained is
clearly inconsistent with congressional intent.
Affording the fish and wildlife agencies and tribes substantial
latitude in prescribing the flows necessary to meet sound biological objectives requires reliance on their predictive judgments. The
foregoing discussion demonstrates that such reliance is endorsed
under a variety of statutory schemes other than the Power and
Conservation Act. Moreover, such predictions also constitute the
basis of other decisions under the Power and Conservation Act.
127.
128.
129.
130.
204-06.
131.

Texas v. EPA, 499 F.2d 289 (5th Cir. 1974).
Id. at 301.
Id. at 301 n.16.
Fishery Agency and Tribal 4(h) Recommendations, supra note 13, at
See supra text accompanying notes 91-96.
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For example, on August 28, 1981, BPA offered a twenty-year
power sale contract to the Alumax Pacific Corporation, entitling
Alumax to 240 megawatts of firm electric power and eighty additional megawatts of interruptible power (a load equivalent to that
of a city of 140,000 people) no later than December 5, 1987.'11
Bonneville offered the Alumax contract without conducting any
supply and demand forecasting to demonstrate whether there will
be sufficient resources to serve the Alumax load. " " The agency
made this contract offer on the basis of an unsupported estimate
of resource availability, despite section 5(d)(4)(C)(i) of the Act,
which requires BPA to condition delivery of the Alumax load on
BPA's ability to acquire sufficient resources to meet that load.'"
If BPA can rely on its predictive judgment to commit the power
system to meet this twenty-year load in the absence of any studies indicating that the necessary resources will in fact be available, " ' the fish and wildlife agencies and the tribes should be able
to make predictive judgments, based on the best data available,
132. See Statement of J. Dexter Peach, Director, Energy and Minerals Divi-

sion, U.S. Gov't Accounting Office, Before the House Subcomm. on Oversight and
Investigations and the Subcomm. on Energy Conservation and Power, Comm. on
Energy and Commerce at 13 (Nov. 10, 1981).
133. See Letter from BPA Administrator Peter Johnson to Regional Council
Chairman Daniel Evans, at 4 (Sept. 29, 1981).
134. 16 U.S.C. § 839c(d)(4)(C)(i) (Supp. IV 1980). The status of the contract
offered to Alumax is affected by the Ninth Circuit's holding that the offers made
to BPA's industrial customers violated the preference clause. See supra note 3.
The Alumax contract was also the subject of a separate suit by the National Wildlife Federation, which alleged that BPA's contract offer violated § 5(d)(4)(C)(i)
and the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA). This suit, along with a suit
filed by Forelaws on Board, alleging a general failure of BPA to comply with
NEPA in offering power sale contracts, were consolidated into one action and dismissed by District Judge James Redden on March 10, 1982. Judge Redden determined that, even though NEPA suits are not specifically mentioned in § 9(e)(5) of
the Act (16 U.S.C. § 839f(e)(5) (Supp. IV 1980)) as actions that must be filed with
the Ninth Circuit, NEPA claims heard .in District Court would "delay dispute resolution and result in an irrational bifurcated system," contrary to the intent of the
Act. Forelaws on Board v. Johnson, No. 81-916 (D. Or. Mar. 10, 1982), appeal
docketed, 82-3257 (9th Cir. May 7, 1982).

135. See U.S.

GEN'L ACCOUNTING OFFICE, ANSWERS TO QUESTIONS ASKED

By

THE SUBCOMM. ON OVERSIGHT AND INVESTIGATIONS AND THE SUBCOMM. ON ENERGY

U.S. HOUSE OF REP15 (n.d.) (concluding that it was "speculative for BPA to conclude
that appropriate resources will be available to meet the Alumax load, absent a
comprehensive action plan to acquire or free up sufficient baseload capacity by
1987") [hereinafter cited as GAO ANSWERS].
CONSERVATION AND POWER, COMM. ON ENERGY AND COMMERCE,
RESENTATIVES
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to estimate the flows necessary to achieve their run size goals.
Power interests have implied that the agency and tribal
recommended flows should be rejected because they cost too
much. They argue that in terms of the replacement costs of the
power foregone, the flows are not worth their purported benefits. 8 But first, even if such a cost-benefit test were permissible,
the measuring costs should not be the replacement costs of new
generating resources.137 As the BPA Administrator has pointed
out (defending his offer of the Alumax contract over objections
that it amounts to an uneconomical bargain), Bonneville does not
match particular loads with specific resources.388 If fish and wildlife protection, but not the Alumax contract,' 8 ' has to meet a replacement cost test then the "equitable treatment" standard embodied in section 4(h)(11)(A)(i) of the Act would not be met."0
Second, given the remedial nature of the 4(h) Program, if a costbenefit test were permissible, any estimate of the hydropower
costs of fish and wildlife protection measures would have to be
discounted by the substantial debt owed by hydropower to the
fish and wildlife resource."' In other words, both past and future
costs imposed upon fish and wildlife due to the development and
operation of the power system must be factored into the equation.
But these objections are largely irrelevant. The command to
achieve sound biological objectives at minimum economic costs
136. See infra note 195. BPA estimates the economic costs of the fishery
agencies' "sliding scale" flows (see supra note 40) to be $170 million annually and
the tribes optimum flows to be $800 million to $1.5 billion annually. BPA COMMENTS, supra note 124, at 36-37. See also BONNEVILLE POWER ADMIN., U.S. Dm'T
oF ENERGY, FINAL BPA ROLE EIS, at B-72 (1980), which sets forth in megawatt

hours the amounts of power "lost" as a result of special flows and spills provided
in 1977-80 for fish, and also estimates the "cost" of that unproduced power in
terms of the barrels of oil required to replace it.
137. BPA has suggested a replacement cost figure of 50 mills per kilowatt
hour, which it considers to be a "conservative assumption." BPA COMMENTS,
supra note 124, at 48.
138. Letter from BPA Administrator Peter Johnson to Regional Council
Chairman Daniel Evans, at 5 (Sept. 29, 1981).
139. BPA's estimated long-run incremental power cost in 1987 is 90 mills per
kilowatt hour, while the estimated cost it will charge for industrial firm power will
be at least 28 mills per kilowatt hour-a difference of nearly 60 mills. GAO ANSWERS,

supra note 135, at 15.

140. 16 U.S.C. § 839b(h)(11)(A) (Supp. IV 1980); see also infra notes 217-35
and accompanying text.
141. See supra notes 15-29 and accompanying text.
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does not allow the 4(h) Program to be judged by a cost-benefit
analysis. Even the Fish and Wildlife Coordination Act's mitigation measures, which Congress found inadequate in enacting the
Power and Conservation Act, are not required to satisfy a costbenefit analysis. The Coordination Act recognizes that these measures are actually a deferred element of the total costs of water
resource developments." Congress did not intend the Power and
Conservation Act to relax the Coordination Act's fish and wildlife
protection; on the contrary, it clearly wished to strengthen them.
The Supreme Court recently considered whether a standard
very similar to "sound biological objectives at minimum economic
cost" included a cost-benefit test. Section 6(b)(5) of OSHA directs the Secretary of Labor to promulgate toxic material standards that "assure worker safety to the extent feasible on the basis of best available evidence."'" In American Textile
Manufacturer's Institute, Inc. v. Donovan, the Court upheld
OSHA's cotton dust standard and rejected industry arguments
that "to the extent feasible" means that the cotton dust regulation must be based on a reasonable relationship between costs
and benefits.1" The Court held that when Congress intends to
require a cost-benefit analysis, it clearly specifies so in the text of
the statute. Not only did Congress fail to authorize the use of
cost-benefit analysis in the Power and Conservation Act, the legislative history indicates that such a threshold is impermissible. 1"
BPA offered the Alumax contract without subjecting it to a
cost-effectiveness test for the same reason it offered all of its August, 1981 long-term power sale contracts without a cost-benefit
analysis: the Power and Conservation Act only requires that new
resource acquisitions meet a cost-effectiveness test.1"6 Section
5(d)(4)(C) of the Act defines Alumax as an "existing direct service
customer."14 7 Presumably, Congress felt that applying the costeffectiveness test to existing customers, which already possessed
142. See Hydropower us. Salmon, supra note 9, at 271-72.
143. 29 U.S.C. § 655(b)(5) (1976).
144. American Textile Mfrs. Inst., Inc. v. Donovan, 452 U.S. 490, 511-12
(1981). See Note, 12 ENvrL. L. 505 (1982).
145. See supra text accompanying note 82.
146. 16 U.S.C. § 839b(e)(1) (Supp. IV 1980).
147. Id. § 839c(d)(4)(C). Power sale contracts to new direct service industries
are forbidden by § 5(d)(2) of the Act. Id. § 839c(d)(2).
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long-term BPA contracts,""8 would be inequitable. Exempting
Alumax from cost-effectiveness considerations may or may not be
a good policy choice, but it is defensible to treat those to whom
we have preexisting obligations differently from new acquisitions.
Fish and wildlife protection mitigation and enhancement are also
preexisting obligations. The Power and Conservation Act did not
create these obligations, it merely prescribes new, more effective
means to fulfill the long overdue debt that the power system owes
to the region's fish and wildlife resources. Requiring that measures designed to repay this debt satisfy a cost-effectiveness test,
but exempting both existing and new power loads from this test,
is particularly inequitable. Such a course of action will perpetuate
the "second class citizen status" of the region's fish and wildlife
resources, 49 will continue the disproportionate costs which hydropower generation imposes upon those who depend upon these resources, and will frustrate the congressional goal of a "co-equal
partnership" between fish and wildlife protection and power production. 1 0 In short, while the cost-effectiveness test may have a
148. Alumax originally signed a power sale contract on July 20, 1966. Because
of a series of legal challenges no BPA power has been delivered to the aluminum
reduction plant, which remains unconstructed. The Alumax situation is an excellent vehicle for examining the problems that regional power planners encountered
in the 1970's. The lawsuits first induced Alumax to relocate the proposed plant
from coastal Clatsop County to Umatilla County, east of the Cascades. Implementation of the contract was then enjoined until BPA prepared an environmental
impact statement on the plant and on its relationship to a power resource acquisitions scheme which the agency and its customers developed, known as Phase 2 of
the Hydro-Thermal Power Program. Port of Astoria v. Hodel, 8 Env't Rep. Cas.
(BNA) 1156 (D. Or. 1975), aff'd 595 F.2d 467 (9th Cir. 1979) (Alumax contract);
Natural Resources Defense Council v. Hodel, 435 F. Supp. 590 (D. Or. 1977), affd
626 F.2d 134 (9th Cir. 1980) (Hydro-Thermal Power Program). For more details
on the Alumax contract and the Hydro-Thermal Power Program, see Foote, Larson & Maddox, Bonneville Power Administration: Northwest Power Broker, 6
ENvTL. L. 831, 844-49 (1976), and K. LEE, D. KLEMKA & M. MARTS, ELECTRIC
POWER AND THE FUTURE OF THE PACIFIC NORTHWEST

118-22 (1980). This litigation

effectively stymied BPA's effort to expand the marketable resources at its disposal, since it was unable to complete the required EISs in a timely fashion. With
the region facing projected electric power shortages in the 1980's (see supra note
2), both the agency and its customers began legislative efforts that culminated in
the enactment of the Power and Conservation Act.
149. "It is clearly intended that no longer will fish and wildlife be given a
secondary status by the Bonneville Power Administration (BPA) or other federal
agencies." 126 CONG. REC. H10,681 (daily ed. Nov. 17, 1980) (remarks of Rep.
Dingell).
150. COMMERCE REPORT, supra note 14, at 49 (fish and wildlife to be treated
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role to play in the implementation of the 4(h) Program, that role
is limited to determining which resources, if any, should be ac-

quired to carry out the program. 51 The cost-effectiveness test is
not an appropriate litmus to judge the merits of the measures included in the program.
One final point is worth pursuing. In the cotton dust case,
although the Supreme Court ruled that a feasibility standard did
not impose a cost-benefit test, the Court indicated that the imposition of such a standard was probably not intended to put the
industry out of business. 0 9 The Power and Conservation Act does
not expressly contain a feasibility standard in its directive to
achieve sound biological objectives at minimum economic cost,
but it should be appropriate to read such a standard into the
hydropower fish and wildlife balancing of standard No. 2.153 Assuming fish and wildlife protection measures achieve sound biological objectives, such measures are appropriate unless they are

econonlically or technologically infeasible. They would be economically or technologically infeasible if they drove an entire
class of power customers out of business or undermined the selffinancing requirements under which BPA must operate. 1 " As
as a "co-equal partner" with other uses in the management and operation of the
power system); and id. at 56, 57 (the 4(h) Program designed to place fish and
wildlife "on a par" with power and other uses).
151. Note that § 6(a)(2) of the Act requires sufficient BPA acquisitions "to
assist meeting the requirements of section 4(h)," and § 4(e)(3)(D) requires the
Regional Council's energy plan to "take into account the effect, if any, of the requirements of [§ 4(h)] on the availability of resources to [BPA]." 16 U.S.C. §§
839d(a)(2), 839b (Supp. IV 1980).
152. See American Textile Mfrs. Inst., Inc. v. Donovan, 452 U.S. 490, 530 n.55
(1981). Ten years earlier the Court ruled that the limits of feasibility were not
reached unless there were "truly unusual factors present . . . or the cost or disruption reached extraordinary magnitudes." Citizens to Preserve Overton Park,
Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 413 (1971).
153. See supra text accompanying note 38.
154. Feasible standards can be burdensome, resulting in reduced profits, and
even bankruptcy for some employers. See Industrial Union Dep't v. Hodgson, 149
F.2d 467, 477-78 (D.C. Cir. 1974); American Fed. of Labor v. Brennan, 530 F.2d
109, 122-23 (3d Cir. 1975) ("Standards may be economically feasible even though,
from the standpoint of employers, they are financially burdensome and affect
profit margins adversely. Nor does the concept of economic feasibility necessarily
guarantee the continued existence of individual employers." But "practical considerations can temper protective requirements"); see also American Iron and Steel
Inst. v. OSHA, 577 F.2d 825 (3d Cir. 1978) (while a massive dislocation is unacceptable, a 13% drop in earnings is not "infeasible").
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long as they are feasible, BPA's costs are to be passed on to the
users of electric power, as expressly provided by section
4(h)(8)(B) of the Act. 155 A heavy burden of demonstrating economic or technological infeasibility should be placed on those
making such claims. This interpretation is essentially the same as
that advanced in the earlier discussion of the Principle of Textual
Consistency. 1"
C. Protecting Indian Treaty Rights
Program approval standard No. 7 requires the Fish and
Wildlife Program to "be consistent with the legal rights of appropriate Indian tribes in the region." This standard reinforces the
point made earlier that the Power and Conservation Act directs
the Council to favor biological results over economic considerations. " 7 But standard No. 7 does more. It also makes express
what would otherwise be an implicit Council obligation: the
Council must fashion its 4(h) Program in a manner designed to
effectuate treaty rights affirmatively. This affirmative obligation
places a burden on the Council to ensure that the 4(h) Program
will provide the Columbia Basin tribes with what the federal
courts ruled was the bargain they struck 125 years ago: sufficient
anadromous fish to enable them to continue to make their livelihood from fishing.
It is not within the scope of this Article to provide a detailed
discussion of Indian treaty rights cases or the canons of treaty
construction that the federal courts employ to construe the rights
the tribes reserved. Nor is it the place to recount the sorry record
of the region's states in a century of efforts designed to diminish
or emasculate the treaty right to fish. Such studies have already
been done, 158 and one has even been provided to the Council as
155. 16 U.S.C. § 839b(h)(8)(B) (Supp. IV 1980). See supra text accompanying
note 84. Interestingly, the cotton dust case indicated that if two methods of

achieving the same result were both "feasible," the more burdensome might not
meet the "reasonably necessary" requirement of the Occupational Safety and
Health Act. 101 S.Ct. at 2493 n.32. This principle, of course, has been codified in
the Power and Conservation Act's program approval standard No. 6 which requires that fish and wildlife measures achieve sound biological objectives at minimum economic cost.

156. See supra text accompanying notes 81-88.
157. See supra text accompanying notes 122-24.

158. See, e.g.,

NATURAL RESOURCES LAW INSTITUTE,

12 ANADROMOUS FISH LAW
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However, a brief survey of some of the results of court decisions will illuminate the scope of the treaty right with respect to
fish.' 60 In a long line of Pacific Northwest Indian treaty fishing
cases, the Supreme Court has held consistently that the region's
states may not take actions, either in their sovereign or proprietary capacity, that directly or indirectly deprive the tribes of fish.
The states cannot convey land titles to non-Indian landowners
that restrict the tribes access to their fishing places;16' they cannot license fish wheels to non-Indians which inhibit tribal fishing;168 they cannot condition tribal fishing upon the payment of
license fees;16 s and, most significantly, they cannot regulate harvest management to deprive the tribes of a fair share of the resource.'" After years of disagreement between the states and the
tribes regarding what such a "fair share" entails, the Supreme
Court basically affirmed Judge George Boldt's seminal fifty-fifty
split in 1979.165
Recent lower court decisions have held that the treaty right
entitles the tribes to more than a percentage share of the steadily
declining runs of anadromous fish. These decisions make it clear
that the treaty right is not a right to fifty percent of little or no
MEMO (April 1981); Hydropower vs. Salmon, supra note 9, at 279-90; Comment,
Empty Victories: Indian Treaty Fishing Rights in the Pacific Northwest, 10
ENVTL. L. 412 (1980); Coggins & Modrcin, Native American Indians and Federal
Wildlife Law, 31 STAN. L. REv. 375 (1979).
159. Columbia River Inter-Tribal Fish Comm'n, Indian Treaty Obligations,
reprinted in Fishery Agency and Tribal 4(h) Recommendations, supra note 13, at
37-95 [hereinafter cited as Columbia River Inter-Tribal Fish Comm'n Study].
160. For a recent general overview of treaty hunting, fishing, and gathering
rights, see F. COHEN, HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW, ch. 8 (1982 ed.).
161. United States v. Winans, 198 U.S. 371 (1905); Seufert Bros. v. United
States, 249 U.S. 194 (1918).
162. United States v. Winans, 198 U.S. 371 (1905).
163. Tulee v. Washington, 315 U.S. 681 (1942).
164. Washington v. Washington State Fishing Vessel Ass'n, 443 U.S. 658
(1979). The state can regulate the tribes' share only where necessary for conservation of the resource. Puyallup Tribe v. Dep't of Game (Puyallup I), 391 U.S. 392
(1968); Puyallup Tribe v. Dep't of Game (Puyallup II), 444 U.S. 441 (1973).
165. Washington v. Washington State Fishing Vessel Ass'n, 443 U.S. 658
(1979), aff'g United States v. Washington, 384 F. Supp. 312 (W.D. Wash. 1974),
afl'd, 520 F.2d 676 (9th Cir. 1975).
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fish. As a result, the treaty right can preserve wetlands ' 66 and
minimum streamflows'l 7 necessary for fish habitat and migration.
It can also limit irrigation diversions, ' enjoin dam construction, 1 "9and even constrain the modification of the Federal Columbia River Power System for peaking power purposes.170 Two recent decisions from the Ninth Circuit (which has jurisdiction over
most of the Columbia Basin) indicate that: (1) hatchery fish are
not suitable compensation to the tribes where rehabilitation of
natural habitat is possible,17 1 and (2) that even decades-old water
rights decrees 7will
be reopened if they are determined to be unfair
1 2
to the tribes.

All of these results flow from the bargain the tribes made
with the federal government over 125 years ago. The treaties
guaranteed to the tribes the right to continue their historic fishing practices, including commercial fishing, in exchange for much
of their land, a staggering sixty-four million acres. It is important
to note that this was a preexisting right on which the courts have
continually ruled the tribes reserved for themselves, not one
which the federal government granted them. Because the federal
courts have been unwilling to assume that the government simply
took advantage of the tribes, they have broadly construed the
scope of the rights that the tribes expressly retained.
This brief review of treaty rights decisions makes Judge Orrick's well-known decision in Phase II of United States v. Wash7
ington1
3 seem neither surprising nor unprecedented. Judge Orrick's decision simply establishes that the burden of protecting
166. United States v. Adair, 478 F. Supp. 336 (D. Or. 1979).
167. United States v. Anderson, No. 3643 (E.D. Wash. July 23, 1979); Kittitas
Reclamation Dist. v. Sunnyside Valley Irrigation Dist., No. 21 (E.D. Wash. Nov.
28, 1980).
168. Pyramid Lake Paiute Tribe v. Morton, 354 F. Supp. 252 (D.D.C. 1973).
169. Confederated Tribes v. Callaway, No. 72-211 (D. Or. Aug. 17, 1973).
170. Confederated Tribes v. Alexander, 440 F. Supp. 553 (D. Or. 1977).
171. Coleville Confederated Tribes v. Walton, 647 F.2d 42, 48 (9th Cir. 1981).
172. United States v. Truckee-Carson Irrigation Dist., 649 F.2d 1286 (9th Cir.
1981).
173. United States v. Washington (Phase II), 506 F. Supp. 187 (W.D. Wash.
1980) (appeal docketed, No. 81-3111 (9th Cir. Feb. 18, 1981)). For more detail on

the Phase II decision, see

NATURAL RESOURCES LAW INSTITUTE, 12 ANADROMOUS
FISH LAW MEMO 12-28 (Apr. 1981); Promising Parity, supra note 12, at 533-36

(1981); Casenote, United States v. Washington (Phase II): The Indian Fishing
Conflict Moves Upstream, 12 ENvTL. L. 469 (1982).
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treaty fishing rights is not one that is to be borne by the nonIndian fishing community alone. All development activities that
adversely affect the water resource upon which the fish depend
must share this burden, including logging, mining, irrigation, and
hydropower development and operation.
The difficulty with the Phase II decision is that it articulates
the right to have fish protected from future man-made despoliation without prescribing a particular remedy. The decision does
not specify which activities violate the treaty right, nor does it
specify what measures must be taken so that these activities can
take place in a manner consistent with the right. These questions
were not at issue in the case. They await future litigation for
clarification.
The Phase II decision, however, does prescribe a set of presumptions and burdens of proof to be used in determining
whether a particular resource development activity violates the
treaty right. First, the tribes have the burden of showing that the
activity "will proximately cause the fish habitat to be degraded
such that the rearing or production potential of the fish will be
impaired or the size or quality of the run will be diminished.

174

There is little question that the tribes could successfully meet
this burden regarding the operation of the Columbia Basin dams.
Once this threshold showing has been made, the burden shifts to
the resource developers to show that the damage to the fishery
"will not impair the tribes' moderate living needs. 1'

5

7

If the

tribes' share has been set at fifty percent of the harvestable fish,
there is a judicial
presumption that these "moderate living" needs
7
are unfulfilled.

0

Given the deteriorated condition of the upriver runs and
174. United States v. Washington (Phase II), No. 9213-I, Amended Judgment 5, at 2-3 (W.D. Wash. Jan. 12, 1981).
175. Id. $ 6 at 3.
176. Id. Under the Supreme Court's Phase I decision, the tribes' allocation
could be set at lower than 50% if the tribes' moderate living needs could be satisfied with less. The Court suggested two situations in which this might occur: (1) if
a tribe were to "dwindle to just a few members" or (2) if a tribe were to "abandon
its fisheries" after finding "other sources of support." Washington v. Washington
State Fishing Vessel Ass'n, 443 U.S. 658, 687 (1979). For an evaluation of the
moderate living standard, see NATURAL RESOURCES LAW INSTITUTE, 12 ANADROMous FISH LAW MEMO 20-22 (Apr. 1981); and Hydropower vs. Salmon, supra note
9, at 284-85 n.384.
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dwindling tribal harvests,177 it is doubtful that resource developers could demonstrate that the moderate living needs of the Columbia Basin tribes have been met. Thus, the tribes appear to

have an existing cause of action that could be brought against a
variety of development activities that adversely affect run size,
particularly the operation of dams. There are two possible reasons

the tribes have not yet filed such a lawsuit: (1) the Phase II decision will not be directly applicable to the Columbia Basin until
affirmed by the Ninth Circuit,17 and (2) the 4(h) Program pro-

vides a possible alternative to costly and protracted litigation.
The 4(h) Program should be viewed as a vehicle to avoid further litigation over treaty rights. Congress apparently intended it

to be such a vehicle, since it expressly established consistency
with treaty rights in program approval standard No. 7. In order to
fulfill this promise, the 4(h) Program must do more than "consider" treaty rights, it must effectuate them. This is an express,

affirmative obligation imposed by the Power and Conservation
79
Act.
The 4(h) Program will not meet this obligation if it attempts

to balance treaty rights against hydropower losses. The treaties
did not reserve to the tribes a right to what the Regional Council
deems to be a reasonable balance between fish and wildlife protection and hydropower generation.180 They reserved to the tribes

177. See Columbia River Inter-Tribal Fish Comm'n Study, supra note 159, at
40 ("[ffor the fifth consecutive year, Columbia River runs have been the lowest on
record"), and 96-109 (graphically depicting run size declines, and noting that "tribal ceremonial and subsistence fisheries have been so curtailed on both the mainstem and tributaries as to be nearly nonexistent").
178. The case has already been briefed and argued. If the 1981 decisions of
the Ninth Circuit concerning treaty fishing rights (see supra notes 171-72) are a
harbinger of the Phase II appeal, resource developers should not rely on a reversal
of the lower court's decision.
179. Notably, in § 10(e) of the Act, Congress disclaimed any intent to alter or
modify treaty rights. 16 U.S.C. § 839g(e) (Supp. IV 1980). Program approval standard No. 7, on the other hand, stipulates that the 4(h) Program must be consistent with treaty rights, implying an affirmative obligation.
180. See Columbia River Inter-Tribal Fish Comm'n Study, supra note 159, at
43. "In the 1850's, these tribes did not qualify [their treaty] rights to make them
consistent with regional energy efficiency, or the economic convenience of its trustee or the energy companies. In fact, the tribe[s] reserved these rights for the
opposite reason-to protect these aboriginal property interests from non-Indian
exploitation. Moreover, the concept of a trustee balancing the beneficiary's interest with its own pecuniary gain is antithetical to established private and Indian
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a right to fish as they always had at their usual places, in order to
pursue their historic means of livelihood. The fulfillment of this
right must be a paramount concern of the 4(h) Program.
Certainly the key issue in meeting program approval standard No. 7 will be the mainstem flow issue. The tribes believe
that their treaty rights entitle them to optimum flows, which is
more than the fish and wildlife agencies have requested. 6 1 If such
optimum flows are biologically justified and economically and
technically feasible, a compelling argument can be made that the
tribes are entitled to these flows. The federal agencies that manipulate Columbia Basin streamflows have a fiduciary obligation
to effectuate treaty rights. 182 This is a trust obligation which they
have often denied and never fulfilled. The obligation has been interpreted to forbid making "judgment calls" designed to reach
decisions that "hopefully everyone [can] live with"; it requires the
use of "statutory and contractual authority to the fullest extent
possible" to effectuate the tribal right. 18
Rejection of the tribal flow recommendations on the basis of
their purported costs alone would not be consistent with the
treaty rights. Manipulation of Columbia Basin streamflows primarily for hydropower generation imposes continuing injuries on
the tribes who depend upon the upriver fisheries for their livelihood. This brings the continued operation of the hydropower system squarely within the ambit of the Phase II ruling.'" As court
decisions involving the Pacific Fishery Management Council's
regulation of the ocean harvest make clear, the courts will not
accept agency claims that they cannot effectuate treaty rights because of their purported costs. As Judge Craig recently stated:
trust principles."
181. See supra note 40.
182. Seminole Nation v. United States, 316 U.S. 286, 297 (1941).
183. Pyramid Lake Paiute Tribe v. Morton, 354 F. Supp. 252, 256 (D.D.C.
1973). While the Council is not a federal agency (see § 4(a)(2)(A), 16 U.S.C.A. §
839b(a)(2)(A)), its 4(h) Program will be implemented by federal agencies (see
notes 217-35 and accompanying text). Moreover, the Power and Conservation Act
makes treaty rights an express obligaton of the Council (see supra text accompanying note 179).
184. The Phase II court limited its holding to prospective or continuing actions that damage the fishery because the tribes did not seek remedial measures.
Thus, the Regional Council may have more discretion in fashioning the enhancement elements of the 4(h) Program. See United States v. Washington, 506 F.
Supp. at 207.
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As I've said before, this Court is concerned with the fundamental
law of the land and that is Indian fishing rights under the treaties
of Governor Stevens; and secondly, the conservation of the salmon
fishery, whatever may be the species.
Whatever happens economically is down the ladder as far as
the Court is concerned and I have a firm belief, at least at this
stage, that if the parties work together to adequately conserve the
fish [and] fulfill the terms of the Stevens Treaty, the economics
will take care of themselves because under an adequate conservation program you are going to increase the number of fish instead
of decrease them. 8

In another case brought by the tribes against the Secretary of
Commerce's ocean management regulations, Judge Schwarzer

stated remarkably similar sentiments:
The whole approach of the Secretary ... was to arrive at a reasonable compromise . . . I think [the Secretary] has been under a lot
of pressure to accommodate a lot of interests, and [the Secretary]
has tried to do that, but that is not compliance with what the Supreme Court has required ....
[Y]ou can't subordinate the United
States treaty obligations to management considerations. Specifically . .. the treaty obligations are a legal obligation that takes
precedence. 181

These decisions again make it clear that a cost-based "judgment
call" by the Council on the mainstem flow issue will not satisfy its
treaty obligations.

How then can the Council avoid the risk that the mainstem
flows it approves will not violate treaty rights? Assuming they are
feasible, anything short of biologically justifiable optimum flows
runs the risk of judicial remand.8 7 The Council may be required
185. Confederated Tribes v. Baldridge, No. C80-342T at 5-6 (W.D. Wash.,
oral ruling, Aug. 4, 1981). The court also stated, "Maybe everybody is going to
have to suffer for awhile like the Yakimas have suffered ..
" Id. at 2-3.
186. Confederated Tribes v. Kreps, No. 79-541 (D. Or., oral ruling, July 11,
1979).
187. If power interests can meet their burden of demonstrating the existence
of a less expensive means of achieving the same sound biological objective, streamflows may not be required. However, the burden is on the power interests to show
that their alternative is "equally effective" in terms of biological results. See supra
note 124. Moreover, it is not entirely clear that artificial transportation by truck
and barge will satisfy treaty rights. The tribes claim that "smolt transportation is
•.. inconsistent with treaty obligations." Fishery Agency and Tribal 4(h) Recommendations, supra note 13, at 340. The Ninth Circuit may agree, see supra note
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to approve flows in excess of those recommended by the fish and

wildlife agencies.98 It certainly must consider seriously the tribes'
recommended flows, and it may not, consistent with the judicial
rulings summarized in this section, reject those flows on the basis
of economic inconvenience. An administrative record that carefully evaluates flow regime alternatives in light of their anticipated biological results must be considered a prerequisite to a defensible 4(h) Program. Moreover, the administrative record
should justify the approved flows as the least burdensome alternative for the fisheries resource.'8s A phased approach to reach or
to determine biologically optimum flows may prove justifiable,
but there is little question that the Council may not reject the
tribes' proffered flows simply because it believes that the benefits
are not worth the costs.
VI.

THE FEASIBILITY STANDARD

vs. A

COST-BENEFIT STANDARD

This Article argues that biological determinations should
take precedence over economic determination in the approval of
the Fish and Wildlife Program."90 It also suggests that a feasibility standard is an appropriate interpretation of the balancing implied in program approval standard No. 2, which directs the program to protect and restore the region's fish and wildlife and
maintain an economical and reliable power supply.'" A twopronged test of (1) biological soundness and (2) economic and
technological feasibility will satisfy the Principle of Textual Consistency, because it reinforces, rather than overrides, the specific
program approval standards discussed in the preceding section.
The first component of the two-pronged test, biological
soundness, will satisfy those standards demanding deference to
the biological judgment of the agencies and tribes that have experience managing fish and wildlife resources."'" The second component, feasibility, will ensure that the program is technically and
171 and accompanying text.
188. See supra note 40.
189. This standard was adopted by Judge Belloni in Sohappy v. Smith, No.
68-409 (D. Or. Oct. 10, 1969), described in Hydropower vs. Salmon, supra note 9,
at 281, 299; see also Promising Parity, supra note 12, at 536 (interpreting the
Phase II decision to require implicitly a similar standard).
190. See supra text accompanying notes 121-25.
191. See supra text accompanying notes 81-88, 153-56.
192. See supra text accompanying notes 97-120.
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economically practicable. It will also pressure power interests to
devise "imaginative and effective measures" to accommodate fish
and wildlife needs within the context of the existing power system. 9 ' The feasibility test will, in short, force the kind of technological and institutional changes that Congress recognized were
necessary.'9"
In contrast, power interests seem to assume a cost-benefit
test as the appropriate standard.'" However, a cost-benefit test
will not satisfy the statutory directives of deference to the judgment of resource managers, preference for biological over economic results, and effectuation of treaty rights. A cost-benefit test
could sanction rejection of feasible and biologically sound fish and
wildlife measures solely on the basis of their purported costs.
Moreover, a cost-benefit test will not only conflict with a number
of 4(h) Program approval standards, it will lead to poor policy
choices. Such a test is particularly inappropriate where it increases the influence of those who have control over the cost
figures, where the risks of failing to take protective action are not
known, where innovation and technological breakthroughs may
reduce implementation costs significantly, and where equity considerations outweigh efficiency concerns. 1 " All of these factors are
present in the 4(h) Program approval process.
First, the estimated costs attributed to the recommended fish
flow regimes are supplied by power interests whose past forecasts
193. See supra text accompanying note 85.
194. See supra text accompanying notes 70-88.
195. BPA believes that [under standard No. 21 the cost of any recommended measure, if unjustified by commensurate benefit, may be sufficient
reason for the Council to reject that measure when the measure, alone or in
combination with other measures, imposes a significant burden on the consumers of the region's power system.
Letter of Janet McLennan, Acting Assistant Power Manager for Natural
Resources to Ed Sheets, Executive Director, Northwest Power Planning Council
(n.d.) at 3, attached as an appendix in BPA Comments, supra note 124.
196. See Andrews, Cost-Benefit Analysis As Regulatory Reform, in CONSERVATION FOUNDATION, COST-BENEFIT ANALYSIS AND ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATIONS:
POLITICS, ETHICS AND METHODS (D. Swartzman, R. Liroff & K. Croke eds. 1982)
[hereinafter cited as CONSERVATION FOUND. STUDY]; see also Rodgers, Benefits,

Costs, and Risks: Oversight of Health and Environmental Decisionmaking, 4
HARV. ENvTL. L. REV. 191 (1980); Baram, Cost-Benefit Analysis: An Inadequate
Basis for Health, Safety, and Environmental Regulatory Decisionmaking, 8
ECOLOGY

L.Q. 473 (1980).
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leave much to be desired. '7 These estimates are premised on
"worst case" planning.1'" They are based on replacement costs,'"
197. The costs that have been attributed to fish flow regimes (see supra note
136) come from power interests, whose past forecasts of power shortages prompted
the region to underwrite three Washington Public Power Supply System
(WPPSS) nuclear plants. The skyrocketing construction costs of these plants have
caused significant increases in BPA's electric rates, and it now appears that any
electricity they may generate will form part of an energy surplus that recent forecasts project to last at least through the remainder of this decade. See BONNEVILLE
POWER ADMIN., U.S. DEP'T OF ENERGY, ANALYSIS OF RESOURCE ALTERNATIVES 4

(April 19, 1982). This projected surplus is based on BPA's 1982 draft load forecast, which estimated that electricity loads would increase only by 1.6% annually
until the year 2000. BONNEVILLE POWER ADMIN., U.S. DEP'T OF ENERGY, BONNEVILLE POWER ADMINISTRATION FORECASTS OF ELECTRICITY CONSUMPTION IN THE PA-

NORTHWEST 1980-2000 5 (June 1982). This is a considerable decrease from
previous forecasts of three to four percent. See, e.g., BONNEVILLE POWER ADMIN.,
U.S. DEP'T OF ENERGY, FINAL ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT STATEMENT, THE ROLE OF
THE BONNEVILLE POWER ADMIN. IN THE PACIFIC NORTHWEST POWER SUPPLY SYSTEM
CIFIC

IV-211 (1980). Until the enactment of the Power and Conservation Act, BPA relied on PNUCC forecasts, which invariably overestimated demand. These overestimations caused unnecessary construction and incurred the criticism of the U.S.
Gen'l Accounting Office. See Hydropower us. Salmon, supra note 9, at 252 n.214.
For example, just two years ago, in its authorized history, BPA projected
"shortages of 2 million kilowatts in 1980-81 under critical water conditions, increasing to 4 million kilowatts in 1990-91 . . . [and] even the best streamflows in
recorded history, if repeated year after year in the decade, would not be enough to
spare the region from serious power shortages." G. NORWOOD, COLUMBIA RIVER
POWER FOR THE PEOPLE: A HISTORY OF THE POLICIES OF THE BONNEVILLE POWER
ADMINISTRATION 278 (1980). Perhaps in recognition of these inaccuracies, §
4(e)(3)(D) of the Power and Conservation Act makes load forecasting a fundamental component of the Regional Council's energy plan. 16 U.S.C. § 839b(e)(3)(D)

(Supp. IV 1980). These sudden surpluses confirm the once-disparaged theory that
electricity consumption is price-elastic, since consumption has dropped as prices
have escalated.
Its new draft forecast induced BPA, within a matter of three weeks, to recom-

mend a delay in the construction schedule of WPPSS Plant No. 1 in Hanford,
Washington, for up to five years. Blessed with an anticipated surfeit of electricity
throughout the remainder of the 1980's, at prices that BPA asserts are approximately equal to those of 1960 in real terms, it is hard to see how fish flows will

jeopardize an adequate, economical, reliable, or efficient power supply. See
BONNEVILLE POWER ADMIN., U.S. DEP'T OF ENERGY, ANALYSIS OF RESOURCE ALTER-

NATIVES (April 19, 1982).
198. In hydropower terms, this "worst case" planning is referred to as "critical water year" planning. In river basins like the Columbia, where average annual
runoff substantially exceeds reservoir capacity, power planners base system operations on the worst streamflows on record in order to increase reliability of serving
loads. For an introduction to critical water year planning, see L. Dean, Understanding Hydroelectric Power System Critical Periods (Feb. 1982) (paper available
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a methodology that has been criticized for overestimating significantly the power costs of fish flows.2 00 Even assuming the continued advisability of "worst case" planning, in three out of four
years the flows recommended by a majority of fish and wildlife
agencies will have essentially no adverse effect on the power
system.2 0 1
Second, fish flows should not be required to meet a cost-benefit test because the potential benefits of various flow regimes
cannot be accurately determined at this time.210 The anadromous
fish life cycle, three to four years or longer depending on the species, precludes short-term estimates of the benefits of flows in advance of 4(h) Program approval. Yet one recent study indicates
that the social costs of not implementing fish flows are more than
double the power interest cost figures.202 In light of the difficulty
from BPA); NATURAL RESOURCES LAW INSTITUTE, 18 ANADROMOUS FISH LAW MEMO
(May 1982). A key assumption underlying critical water year planning is that
power losses in very low water years would be severe. Consequently, reservoirs are
refilled during the spring and maintained at high levels well into the summer to
ensure that large fall and winter power demands can be met. This deprives downstream migrating anadromous fish of the spring flows they need to reach the
ocean. See supra text accompanying notes 9-10. The result of this "worst case,"
risk-averse planning is severe fish and wildlife costs in average water years. See
infra note 203.
199. BPA bases its estimated fish flow costs on a replacement cost figure of 50
mills per kilowatt hour. See supra note 137. Note that no existing or new power
load is evaluated using a replacement cost test. See supra text accompanying note
138 and infra note 209.
200. P. Meyer, Fish, Energy and the Columbia River: An Economic Perspective on Fisheries Values Lost and at Risk 22 (March, 1982) (paper produced for
the Northwest Resource Information Center and submitted to the Regional Council, summarized in NATURAL RESOURCES LAW INSTITUTE, 18 ANADROMOUS FISH LAW
MEMO 9 (May 1982)). However, BPA considers its cost estimates to be "based on
very conservative assumptions." BPA COMMENTS, supra note 124, at 48.
201. Fishery Agency and Tribal 4(h) Recommendations, supra note 13, at
198.
202. Lack of reasonably accurate figures for cost-benefit assessments is a pervasive problem. See, e.g., Liroff, Cost-Benefit Analysis in Federal Environmental
Programs, in CONSERVATION FOUND. STUDY, supra note 196, at 43-46 (describing
quantification problems in pollution control programs).
203. See P. Meyer, supra note 200, at 18 (estimating the economic costs of
salmon and steelhead losses caused by operating the Columbia River system
predominantly for hydropower to be $372 million annually; cumulative costs since
1960 to be $6.5 billion; and future costs of $3.7 billion per decade); see also E.
Chaney, Cogeneration of Electrical Energy & Anadromous Salmon & Steelhead
in the Upper Columbia River Basin: An Economic Perspective on the Question of
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of quantifying flow benefits, the scarcity of adequate data, 04 and
the need for prompt action to protect and restore the fish runs, it
is not surprising that Congress declined to authorize a cost-benefit test in the Act.

Third, a cost-benefit test would inhibit badly needed technological innovation 0 5 and tend to legitimate the status quo, which
Congress determined was unacceptable 2 0 For example, more cre-

ative use of power exchanges outside the Pacific Northwest, coordination of thermal plant maintenance schedules, and development of an aluminum ingot storage program could supply

markets for the power that would be generated during the spring
fish flows. 2 0 7 Such power "benefits" are seldom factored into the
Balance 9-10 (June 1982) (paper available from the Northwest Resource Information Center).
204. The volatility of the cost figures assigned to fish flows is suitably illustrated by the fact that estimates of firm electric power losses that would accompany the "sliding scale" flows cascaded downward from 780 megawatts to 450
megawatts, a 42% reduction, in the five months between the submission of the
fish and wildlife agency and tribal recommendations and the close of the public
comment period on them. Compare Fishery Agency and Tribal 4(h) Recommendations, supra note 13, at 204 (780 megawatts) with BPA Comments, supra note
124, at 35-36 (450 megawatts).
205. Critics claim the short-term energy impact of modifying hydroelectric
operations to protect fish could be significantly mitigated by innovative interregional power exchanges and/or sales, strategically tapping the enormous potential for energy conservation, voluntary curtailments in consumption during critical periods, making interruptible power deliveries
interruptible in practice as well as price, etc. Even absent these things, the
projected "energy cost" of modifying hydroelectric operations would plummet if fish were charged at the same rate as say the aluminum companies.
The energy system can and will adjust to capitalize on restored fish
flows to generate hydroelectric energy. Indeed, there is much evidence
which suggests that in the long term, fish flows, innovative load shaping,
interregional power exchanges, utilization of uncontracted water in existing
federal storage reservoirs and construction of new upstream storage projects
will result in greater hydroelectric production and revenue than at present.
E. Chaney, supra note 203, at 8, 12.
206. See, e.g., supra notes 16-19 and accompanying text.
207. See generally Romer Associates, Northwest Electric Load Shaping for
Fish Enhancement, reprinted in Fishery Agency and Tribal Flow Recommendations, supra note 13, Vol. II, at app. A-A (discussing a variety of mechanisms to
reduce the power costs associated with spring fish flows, including thermal plant
maintenance schedules, interregional exchanges, water purchases, conservation
programs, and acquiring seasonal generating resources).
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power "costs" of fish flows. 08
Fourth, it is inequitable to use a cost-benefit test for fish
flows when new power loads are not subjected to the same test.
Power loads are met without regard to any cost considerations, let
alone replacement costs.2 09 Since Congress mandated "equitable
treatment" for fish and wildlife and a "co-equal partner" status
with power generation, 210 fish flows necessary to begin repaying
the preexisting power system debt should be treated no differently from new power loads.

Fifth, a cost-benefit standard is inappropriate because it assumes that Congress delegated plenary authority to the Council
to make value judgments concerning the appropriate mix of fish

and wildlife protection and hydropower generation.2 " Congress

made no such broad delegation in the Power and Conservation
Act. On the contrary, Congress established numerous mandatory
directives and standards for the 4(h) Program, placing the burden

on the Council to demonstrate that the program meets the statutory criteria. 1

As a result, implying the authority to base pro-

208. To its credit, BPA did examine "alternative institutional arrangements,"
such as changes in thermal plant maintenance schedules and increased interregional electricity transfers, in its comments on the 4(h) Recommendations. BPA
COMMENTS, supra note 124, at 49-53. However, the agency appears to discount
these techniques as potential cost-saving mechanisms. Id. at 52-53. If BPA is correct in its assertion that California utilities are not willing to pay any more than
"spill prices" for fish flow-induced power generation, it may be necessary to consider constructing new interties to connect the Pacific Northwest with utilities
along its eastern and southeastern perimeters. This would also facilitate marketing of the anticipated surplus of power expected through the 1980's. See supra
note 197.
209. See supra note 138. See also Letter from James S. Jones, Ass't Adm'r
for Power Management, BPA, to H. Larkin, Regional Director, National Marine
Fisheries Service (Nov. 12, 1981). These inequities prompted one commentator to
note:
Critics charge the BPA cost estimate is a worst-case projection. That it ignores sources of lower cost replacement energy and ignores means of significantly reducing the amount of energy that would have to be replaced. And
that it perpetuates the traditional double standard of charging fish at thermal replacement rates (37-50 mills), a price that no energy consumer, not
even the nonexistent Alumax aluminum plant, is required to pay.
E. Chaney, supra note 203, at 8.
210. See supra note 150 and accompanying text.
211. See Andrews, supra note 196, at 112, 116-17.
212. See supra notes 30-63 and accompanying text.
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gram measures on a cost-benefit test risks judicial remand."' 3
Finally, a cost-benefit test should not be implied, because a
better standard is available. This Article illustrates that a feasibility standard is more consistent with the text, structure, and
legislative history of the Power and Conservation Act. A feasibility standard avoids problems associated with economic figures
that are based on questionable assumptions supplied by unreliable sources. A feasibility standard will not, however, place the Regional Council in a straitjacket; economic costs are not entirely
irrelevant under this standard1 4 and a phased implementation
approach seems permissible. 1 5 The use of a feasibility standard
to judge the merits of 4(h) Program measures is the best means to
ensure that the Pacific Northwest will have both viable upriver
anadromous fish runs and an economical and reliable power
2 6
supply. 1
VII.

EFFECTUATING THE 4(H) PROGRAM THROUGH EQUITABLE
TREATMENT RECORDS

The Regional Council's fish and wildlife responsibilities will
not terminate with its approval of a Fish and Wildlife Program.
The Power and Conservation Act gives the Council continuing responsibility to oversee the implementation of the program. Section 4(h)(12)(A) of the Act requires the Council to submit an annual report to Congress on its activities, including its activities
under section 4(h). 1 7 Section 4(i) gives the Council the authority
to review the actions of BPA under the Act, including BPA's actions implementing section 4(h).1s The Council must take its 4(h)
oversight responsibilities seriously. The Coordination Act experience illustrates"19 that the federal water management agencies
have been a principal reason for the disenfranchisement of fish
213. See supra text accompanying notes 144-45.

214. See supra note 154.
215. See supra text following note 189.
216. BPA admits that the fishery agencies' "sliding scale" fish flows are feasi-

ble on the mainstem Columbia; they may not be feasible one year in three on the
Snake. The feasibility of the tribes' optimum flows appears to be highly questionable, at least under the critical water planning assumptions. See BPA COMMENTS,
supra note 124, at 37, 42.
217. 16 U.S.C. § 839b(h)(12)(A) (Supp. IV 1980).
218. 16 U.S.C. § 839b(i) (Supp. IV 1980).
219. See supra notes 15-29 and accompanying text.
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and wildlife interests in the past. There is little reason to believe
that passage of the Act has materially changed their attitudes.
In an effort to overcome the institutional bias of these management agencies, the fish and wildlife agency and tribal recommendations include a series of institutional objectives.2 2 The controversy over the agency and tribal biological objectives should
not obscure the critical importance of restructuring decisionmaking processes, the aim of these institutional objectives. No longterm relief for the region's fish and wildlife will occur unless old
ways of making decisions change.
The goal of all these institutional objectives is to ensure that
the federal water managers-the Bonneville Power Administration, the United States Army Corps of Engineers, the Bureau of
Reclamation, and the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission-carry out the obligations that section 4(h)(11) imposes
upon them. Section 4(h)(11) places three duties on these agencies:
(1) to exercise their responsibilities consistent with the Act
and other laws to adequately protect, mitigate, and enhance fish and wildlife in a manner that provides equitable treatment for fish and wildlife with the other
22 1
purposes;
(2) to take into account at each relevant stage of their decision-making processes the 4(h) Program to the fullest
extent practicable; 2 and
(3) to consult with the region's federal and state fish and
wildlife agencies, Indian tribes, and affected project operators in carrying out their "equitable treatment" and
"to the fullest extent practicable" obligations, and to coordinate their actions to the greatest extent
220. Fishery Agency and Tribal 4(h) Recommendations, supra note 13, at
679-718, summarized in NATURAL RESOURCES LAW INSTITUTE, 16

ANADROMOUS

FISH LAW MEMO 8-11 (Dec. 1980).
221. 16 U.S.C. § 839b(h)(11)(A)(i) (Supp. IV 1980); see Promising Parity,
supra note 12, at 529-31.
222. 16 U.S.C. § 839b(h)(11)(A)(ii) (Supp. IV 1980). "To the fullest extent
practicable" means full compliance unless prohibited by existing statutory or regulatory requirements. See 15 C.F.R. § 930.32 (1982) (Nat'l Oceanic and Atmospheric Admin. Regulations implementing the Coastal Zone Management Act), 40
C.F.R. § 1500.3 (1981) (Council on Environmental Quality regulations implementing the National Environmental Policy Act).
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practicable.22
In addition to these duties imposed on all four federal agencies,
BPA has an additional obligation prescribed by section
4(h)(10)(A). BPA must:
use the BPA Fund and its authorities to protect, mitigate, and enhance fish and wildlife to the extent affected by the development
and operation of the FCRPS in a manner consistent with the 4(h)
Program and the purposes of the Act. 2'
This latter directive imposes a higher burden on BPA than does
the "fullest extent practicable" obligation, since it requires unqualified consistency with the 4(h) Program.
Effective implementation of these directives is essential if the
Power and Conservation Act is to meet its objective of preserving
and restoring the region's fish and wildlife resources. These directives will not be self-executing. Unless the federal water managers document in written administrative records how their actions
fulfill these mandates, the public and the Council will have no
assurance that these provisions are in fact being implemented.
Unfortunately, it is all too easy to find grounds for the fear
that federal water managers will not voluntarily pursue the section 4(h)(10) and (11) directives. For example, the staff of the
Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) has recently asserted that "new developments in the law (i.e., the Power and
Conservation Act) do not expand the Commission's authority or
responsibilities with respect to the fisheries resource."22 Consequently, there is no documentation of "equitable treatment" in
FERC's decision to relicense the Rock Island Dam over the objections of the region's federal and state fish and wildlife agencies
223. 16 U.S.C. § 839b(h)(11)(B) (Supp. IV 1980).
224. Id. § 839b(h)(10)(A).
225. Federal Energy Regulatory Comm'n, Staff Response to Petition (of the
Region's Federal and State Fish and Wildlife Agencies and the Confederated
Tribes of the Umatilla Indian Nation To Set Aside the Mid-Columbia Settlement
Agreement) (Dec. 16, 1981). Recently, however, the FERC staff seems to have
modified this position. Responding to a request from the Regional Council that
the agency begin to make findings with respect to its obligations under the Power
and Conservation Act; the FERC staff promised it would begin to do so, although
it left open the effect of such findings on existing licenses. See NATURAL RESOURCES LAW INSTITUTE, 18 ANADROMOUS FISH LAW MEMO 11 (May 1982).
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and tribes.2 26 Similarly, BPA failed to explain how its decision to
offer power sale contract amendments authorizing reservoir
drawdowns to produce hydropower generation in the late summer
and early fall will result in equitable treatment for fish and wildlife. " ' The Corps of Engineers has been equally silent with respect to its annual operating plan for its Columbia Basin dams.
The "equitable treatment" directive applies independently of
the 4(h) Program. It was effective immediately upon the passage
of the Power and Conservation Act on December 5, 1980; as of
July, 1982, there has been no sign that it has had any effect on
operational decisions of the federal water managers. Unless the
4(h) Program requires these agencies to enter into Memoranda of
Agreement that explain how the agencies will document their
compliance with this directive,2 it will continue to be ignored.
Absent such agreements, the other provisions listed above that do
not apply until there is an approved 4(h) Programn2 will likely
meet a similar fate.
It is not altogether surprising that the federal water managers have not embraced the "equitable treatment" obligation. The
provision is clearly designed to require more action than that
which the Coordination Act's "equal consideration"280 provision
produced. "Treatment" anticipates results, not merely consideration or consultation. "Equitable" means fair and just. This standard should be interpreted in light of the Act's remedial goals"'
and its legislative history. The House Commerce Committee Report states that the fish and wildlife resource should henceforth
be considered as a "co-equal partner" and be treated "on a par"
with other project purposes.28 2 This standard reflects Congress's
determination that decisions affecting fish and wildlife must not
226. See NATURAL RESOURCES LAW INSTITUTE,
MEMO 17-18 (Aug. 1981).

15 ANADROMOUS FISH LAW

227. See NATURAL RESOURCES LAW INSTITUTE, 17 ANADROMOUS FISH LAW
MEMO 24-25 (April 1982).
228. See Fishery Agency and Tribal 4(h) Recommendations, supra note 13, at
694-95. The Regional Council has recently begun to request such findings, see
supra note 213.
229. See supra text accompanying notes 222-24.
230. See supra text accompanying notes 20-29.
231. See supra text accompanying notes 15-19.
232. See supra note 150 and accompanying text.
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be exclusively based on cost considerations.2 8
Interpreting the meaning of "equitable treatment," however,
is considerably easier than ensuring that equitable treatment occurs. As a prerequisite to the decisionmaking changes this standard anticipates, the 4(h) Program should require that federal
water managers systematically document how their decisions
achieve equitable results. Documentation should be in the form of
publicly reviewable records (i.e., "equitable treatment statements"). The program should also require documented compliance with the other directives contained in sections 4(h)(10) and
(11).""4 Such administrative records will facilitate public, Council,
and congressional oversight of the decisions of federal water management agencies whose past actions have often failed to account
adequately for fish and wildlife effects.23"
VIII.

CONCLUSION

Aware of the Fish and Wildlife Coordination Act's failure to
protect adequately the Columbia Basin's fish and wildlife, Congress devoted one-tenth of the text of the Power and Conservation Act to fish and wildlife protection and restoration. The Re233. Equity or equitable distribution is the decision rule most often juxtaposed with efficiency. Although efficiency generates savings, if the savings
are not used to benefit those who stand to lose for efficiency's sake, then
society may often opt for a less cost-effective, but more equitable, option.
Governmental equity considerations seek to determine who gets the pieces
of the pie and how big each person's share is. Cost-benefit analysis as currently practiced has little to say on this question.
Swartzman, Cost-Benefit Analysis in Environmental Regulation: Sources of Controversy, in CONSERVATION FOUND. STUDY, supra note 196, at 64.
234. See supra text accompanying notes 222-24.
235. These records should (1) help focus the attention of decisionmakers on
fish and wildlife impacts, (2) increase intergovernmental review by agencies with
fish and wildlife missions, and (3) facilitate judicial review. They may therefore
have some of the same salutory benefits on administrative agencies as has the
National Environmental Policy Act. See, e.g., R. ANDREws, ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY AND ADMINISTRATIVE CHANGE 154 (1976). In fact, in ensuring that equitable
treatment and compliance with the 4(h) Program does indeed take place, the Regional Council might draw useful institutional analogies from the experience of
the Council on Environmental Quality. See N. ORLOFF & G. BROOKS, THE NATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY ACT: CASES AND MATERIALS 44 (1980) (noting the
influence of CEQ in negotiating changes in agency decisions); but cf. R. LIROFF, A
NATIONAL POLICY FOR THE ENVIRONMENT: NEPA AND ITS AFTERMATH 72-73 (1976)

(a more critical view of CEQ's accomplishments).
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gional Act is designed to overcome these failures by (1) replacing
federal water manager discretion with the Regional Council's 4(h)
Program, (2) setting tight time deadlines designed to produce immediate and substantial relief, and (3) recognizing the importance
of restoring the badly depleted upriver fish and wildlife resources.
The Coordination Act's failures provide an unfortunate precedent
which the Council's Fish and Wildlife Program must avoid if it is
to realize its remedial purposes.
The Power and Conservation Act's 4(h) Program approval
standards are designed to insure that the Coordination Act's failures are not repeated. By making the statutory findings of consistency with these standards and by employing the Principle of
Textual Consistency in interpreting the meaning of these standards, the Council will structure its discretion in ways that should
produce effective program measures. In particular, the program
approval standard No. 2 requiring the 4(h) Program "to protect,
mitigate, and enhance fish and wildlife while assuring an adequate, efficient, economical and reliable power supply" must be
construed to embrace, not override, more specific standards, such
as "complementing existing and future activities of federal and
state fish and wildlife agencies and Indian tribes," "achieving biological objectives," and "protecting Indian treaty rights." This interpretation is not only a venerable tenet of statutory construction, it is mandated by the express language of the Power and
Conservation Act. It is also justified by the structure and legislative history of the Act, both of which envision substantial accommodations by the power system to protect and restore the region's
fish and wildlife resources.
Adopting the Principle of Textual Consistency means that
the Regional Council should approve recommended program measures if they are (1) biologically sound, and (2) economically and
technologically feasible. This two-pronged test requires that the
Council defer to the biological judgment of the region's fish and
wildlife agencies and Indian tribes. The test also precludes use of
a cost-benefit test to judge the merits of recommended program
measures because biological outcomes must take precedence over
economic outcomes.2 If a fish and wildlife measure is biologically
236. For a recent theoretical justification of laws that prefer biological over
economic outcomes, see Rodgers, Building Theories of JudicialReview in Natural
Resources Law, 53 U. COLO. L. REV. 213, 214-15 (1982).
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sound and feasible to implement, economic costs are relevant only
to determine the cheapest means of implementing that measure,
not whether it should be adopted. The feasibility standard will
ensure that power system managers are pressured to devise imaginative and innovative means of preserving and enhancing Columbia Basin fish and wildlife resources, a result Congress clearly intended. The standard will also satisfy the Council's obligation to
effectuate affirmatively Indian treaty fishing rights, considerably
reducing the risk of judicial remand.
The feasibility standard is not only consistent with the Council's statutory and treaty obligations, it will also facilitate the
Council's task in developing an effective 4(h) Program. It avoids
the difficult valuation problems inherent in a cost-benefit test,
which appear to be insurmountable in the time the Council has to
develop the Fish and Wildlife Program. Moreover, the feasibility
standard will better enable the Council to monitor program implementation and modify the program, as the bounds of economic
and technical feasibility become more clear with time."s3 Finally,
the feasibility standard will not result in unreasonable economic
results-it is not cost-oblivious. The Council can refuse or delay
program measures that it determines are biologically unjustified
or economically or technically infeasible.
Finally, approval of a 4(h) Program by the Regional Council
will not improve the plight of the region's fish and wildlife by
itself. The program must be implemented by a diverse array of
institutions and may require state water rights proceedings, 28 appeals to the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission," 9 and nego237. The limits of feasibility may be clarified somewhat when the Council's
electric energy plan is approved in April, 1983. Since the level of fish flows is
closely related to the operation of the hydropower system, one element of the
Council's electric energy plan should be a critical evaluation of alternative operating arrangements that could reduce friction between fish protection and power
operations. For example, conservation measures, load management devices such as
surcharges, additional reserves, and increased interconnection with other regions
may offer the kinds of "imaginative and innovative measures that Congress desired." See supra text accompanying note 85 and NATURAL REsouRcE LAW INSTITTrrE, 18 ANADROMoUs FiSH LAW MEMO 4 (May 1982).

238. Section 10(h) of the Power and Conservation Act (16 U.S.C. § 839g(h)
(Supp. IV 1980)) reserves to states the role of appropriating water, so if the program's fish flows are to be protected against irrigation diversions, the flows must
be established pursuant to state law.
239. Section 10(i) of the Act (16 U.S.C. § 839g(i) (Supp. IV 1980)) preserves
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tiations with Canada.' 4" The Council can initate some of these institutional changes by requiring federal water managers to
develop administrative records that document compliance with
the "equitable treatment" directive and the 4(h) Program. This
will facilitate oversight of program implementation by the public,
the Council, Congress, and the courts." 1 There is little question
that such oversight is necessary if the Power and Conservation
Act's promise of parity for fish and wildlife is to be fulfilled.

"the validity" of existing licenses, such as those issued by the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) to nonfederal dams. Thus, changes in operating conditions mandated by the 4(h) Program must be ratified by FERC. See NATURAL
RESOURCES LAW INSTITUTE,

18

ANADROMOUS FISH LAW MEMO 10-11 (May

1982).

240. Canadian negotiations might be necessary to clarify whether Canadian
reservoirs constructed pursuant to the Columbia River Treaty (see Hydropower
vs. Salmon, supra note 9, at 243-49) can be drafted to help provide fish flows and
also to reach an agreement on Canadian ocean harvests of Columbia Basin runs.
241. If "multiple use" directives provide law for courts to apply, then surely
"equitable treatment" supplies a judicially reviewable standard. See Coggins, Of
Succotash Syndromes and Vacuous Platitudes: The Meaning of "Multiple Use,
Sustained Yield" for Public Land Management (PartI), 53 U. CoLo. L. REv. 229
(1982).
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